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INTRODUCTION1.
The objective of this review is to highlight key features 
of the political landscape that are considered to affect 
both the prospects for and the outcomes of agricultural 
commercialisation in Tanzania. It will highlight key 
dynamics and actors that subsequent empirical work 
within the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) 
programme should pay attention to.
A defining feature of Tanzania’s political system is the 
hegemonic position of the ruling party, Chama cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM),2 which has held power continuously 
since independence in 1961 (Whitfield et al. 2015; 
Hoffman 2013; Whitehead 2012). However, during this 
period the character of CCM has changed considerably, 
especially in response to economic crisis in the 1980s 
and the challenges presented by multi-party electoral 
competition since the 1990s (Whitfield et al. 2015; Tilley 
2014). Firstly, to maintain its dominant position in a 
multi-party context, the party has embraced business 
interests that were officially shunned during the socialist 
era presided over by Julius Nyerere. Secondly, a 
consequence of the regular need to mobilise votes is 
that officials at the lower levels of the party structure 
(from district down to neighbourhood) have acquired 
additional influence over the party’s fortunes. Thus, 
the party has transformed from a relatively disciplined 
organisation with a clear ideological orientation to the 
vehicle of choice for people who are ambitious for power 
or money, irrespective of their ideological persuasion. 
Moreover, within the party, power has become less 
centralised as contrasting groups – major funders and 
local cadres – have acquired holding power3 in internal 
debates and struggles. As a consequence, a shifting 
array of individuals and groups across multiple levels 
of the party structure now contest the formulation and 
implementation of policy (Gray 2015; Whitfield et al. 
2015).
This paper illustrates these dynamics in relation to 
policies for agricultural commercialisation. It argues that 
the evolving nature of CCM helps to explain observed 
agricultural policy and performance and sheds light on 
the current and potential future trajectory of agricultural 
commercialisation in the country. The paper focuses 
on the presidency of Jakaya Kikwete and the transition 
to the presidency of John Magufuli. While the period 
of multi-party electoral competition started in 1995, 
the full impacts of the changes within CCM are best 
observed within this period. In turn, the changes within 
CCM threaten its ability to deliver developmental 
benefits to particular social groups, including rural 
households for whom smallholder farming remains an 
important livelihood activity. The final section of the 
paper, therefore, considers the political challenge facing 
President Magufuli if he wants to (re-) establish CCM 
as a party that delivers livelihood improvements to this 
important group of voters.
The paper advances its arguments through reference to 
three commodities: rice, sugar and cotton. The first two 
of these are produced for domestic consumption and 
Tanzania remains dependent on imports to supplement 
domestic production. The majority of cotton production 
is currently exported as raw fibre (lint), but around 20 
percent is used by domestic textile and garments firms. 
Rice is Tanzania’s third largest crop by volume, after 
maize and cassava. It is produced in most regions 
of the country, primarily by smallholders, with major 
production zones including Mbeya, Morogoro and 
the north-western regions of Shinyanga, Tabora and 
Mwanza (Lazaro, Sam and Thompson 2017; Wilson and 
Lewis 2015). It is the most commercialised of Tanzania’s 
staple food crops, reflecting the strong demand for 
rice in major urban centres (Wilson and Lewis 2015). 
The development of irrigation schemes to facilitate 
smallholder production of rice was a major thrust of 
the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) 
under President Kikwete, but production remains 
predominantly rainfed (Cooksey 2012; Therkildsen 
2011). Large-scale production of rice occurs principally 
in Mbeya and Morogoro regions. It accounts for about 
6 percent of national production, but a higher share of 
marketed output (Wilson and Lewis 2015).4
Sugar production in Tanzania focuses on four large-
scale estates in Morogoro region (Kilombero and 
Mtibwa), Kilimanjaro and Kagera. According to 
Mmari (2015), in 2013 more than 20,000 smallholder 
outgrowers supplied around 40 percent of cane to the 
factories at Kilombero and Mtibwa, although reliance on 
smallholders is declining in Mtibwa. A growing number 
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of medium-scale farmers also sell sugar to these 
factories (Sulle 2016).
Cotton is produced predominantly by smallholder 
farmers in the Lake Zone of Tanzania (the regions close 
to Lake Victoria in the north west), where it competes 
with rice and other crops for farmers’ attention.
This paper focuses on agricultural commercialisation 
and policy on Tanzania’s mainland. Agricultural policy 
is designed and implemented separately on the 
semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar. Some rice is 
produced on Zanzibar, where it is the staple food. There 
is also one recently revived sugar factory with a core 
estate and smallholder outgrowers. However, like the 
mainland, Zanzibar remains dependent on imports of 
both commodities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section  2 reviews 
electoral trends in Tanzania since 1995, leading to a 
discussion of how CCM maintains power, and where 
agricultural policy fits into this, in section 3. The rise 
of large-scale and (especially) medium-scale farms in 
Tanzania is discussed in section 4. Section 5 reviews 
a number of recent policy documents pertaining 
to agricultural policy, including commercialisation, 
and illustrates the contestation of policy in this area. 
Section 6 presents the case studies from rice, sugar 
and cotton. Although the first two of these draw 
on secondary literature, there is value in comparing 
findings and identifying common themes across cases. 
Section 7 reflects on agricultural policy processes in 
Tanzania, drawing on the three case studies. Finally, 
section 8 considers the prospects of agricultural 
commercialisation in Tanzania being successfully 
promoted under the presidency of John Magufuli, 
given the political challenges highlighted by the three 
commodity case studies.
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Having become a one-party state almost immediately 
after independence, Tanzania re-introduced multi-party 
elections in 1995. While this move mirrored a much 
broader trend in Africa (Bates and Block 2009) and was 
consistent with the views of international development 
partners, there was also important support for it 
from within CCM, including from former President 
Nyerere (Tilley 2014; Whitfield et al. 2015). Multi-party 
competition was one way to restore the legitimacy of 
CCM, which had waned through a decade of economic 
crisis.
Table 1 summarises some key statistics from the five 
sets of national elections that have occurred since 1995. 
It shows that CCM has remained the dominant party 
throughout the two decades of multi-party elections. 
ELECTORAL TRENDS IN 
TANZANIA
2.
Table 1: Selected statistics from Tanzanian general elections









CCM share of 
parliamentary 
vote (%)
CCM share of 
all parliamentary 
seats (%)*
2015 58 40 67 59 69
2010 63 27 43 60 74
2005 80 12 72 70 85
2000 72 16 84 65 87
1995 62 28 77 59 80
Sources: www.nec.go.tz (various election reports), http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html
Note: * Surprisingly, different sources give different figures for the total number of seats during the various parliaments, so there could be a small margin of error 
in the figures in this column.
Despite its perceived waning legitimacy in 1995, CCM 
achieved a clear majority of votes in both the presidential 
and parliamentary elections of that year. Its share of 
parliamentary seats exceeded its share of votes due to 
the first-past-the-post system of voting for Members of 
Parliament (MPs) and the provision for a number of MPs 
to be appointed by the President in addition to those 
directly elected. The party then consolidated its position 
in the next two elections, arguably vindicating the stand 
of those who had argued that the party should embrace, 
rather than resist, the tide of multi-party competition. 
However, its position was somewhat eroded in 2010 
and 2015, reflecting popular disenchantment with poor 
state performance and widespread corruption. 
The most striking statistic in relation to the 2010 
election is the low turnout. While many traditional 
CCM voters, especially in rural areas, did not switch 
their votes to opposition candidates, they did register 
their disgruntlement by not turning out to vote. The 
opposition, which garnered support primarily in urban 
constituencies, thus achieved a similar result to 1995. 
However, opposition votes were split between two main 
candidates in 2010 (in 1995 there were three), so the 
overall result remained a comfortable victory for CCM.
In 2015, most of the major opposition groups allied 
under the banner of Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi 
(UKAWA),5 which backed a single presidential candidate 
– the former CCM Prime Minister Edward Lowassa. 
Lowassa could contribute considerable personal wealth 
to the opposition campaign, but his selection was at 
odds with the anti-corruption platform that several 
opposition leaders had campaigned on over the years, 
thereby at least partially undermining the advantages of 
a well-funded and largely united opposition campaign 
(Makamba 2015). Nevertheless, the outcome was the 
closest yet.6 It was also the subject of legal challenges 
by the opposition, who claimed that they had won.
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Scholars debate the factors that have enabled CCM 
to maintain its hegemonic position even since the 
introduction of multi-party elections (Hoffman and 
Robinson 2009; O’Gorman 2012; Whitehead 2012). A 
shared common assumption in these debates is that 
the party has not maintained its dominance through 
high-quality governance and service delivery. Some 
insight into this is provided by Table 2, which shows 
progress on a number of important social and economic 
indicators over the past 20 years, but also a rapidly 
growing and still predominantly rural population in which 
many people remain extremely poor. Indeed, (O’Gorman 
2012: 315) specifically addresses ‘the puzzle of… rural 
support for the CCM amid rural neglect’.
HOW DOES CCM RETAIN 
POWER?
3.
Table 2: Tanzanian social and economic indicators
1995 2005 2015
Population (millions) 29.9 39.1 53.5
Urbanisation rate (%) 21 25 32
Gross national income (GNI) per capita (constant 2010 US$) 450 604 828
Poverty headcount ($1.90/person/day @ 2011 purchasing 
power parity (PPP))
85% (2000) 53% (2007) 47% (2011)
Urban poverty rate at national poverty line - - 16% (2011)
Rural poverty rate at national poverty line - - 33% (2011)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 49 56 65 (2014)
Adjusted net enrolment rate in primary education (%) 49 89 82 (2013)
Pupil-teacher ratio in primary school 37 56 43 (2013)
Transition rate to lower secondary education (%) - 33 (2004) 56 (2012)
Adult literacy rate (aged 15+) - 69% (2002) 80% 
Urban population with access to clean water (%) 89 83 77
Rural population with access to clean water (%) 45 45 46
Maize production (tons per head of population)* 0.08 0.1 0.11 (2013)
Source: World Development Indicators database [accessed 9 January 2017]
Note: Except * calculated from FAOstat using three-year production averages. Yield data are considered too unreliable to report here.
Existing literature argues that CCM ‘hegemony’ has 
been sustained by maintaining an unchallenged ability 
to fight elections. There are several dimensions to this. 
The first is the party’s superior financial position 
for fighting elections. This is partly a (deliberate) 
consequence of the country’s electoral rules, which 
allocate state funding for political campaigns on the 
basis both of a party’s previous vote share and its share 
of seats in parliament. As shown in Table 1, not only 
has CCM gained comfortably the highest share of the 
vote of any party, with opposition votes split across 
several parties, but it also obtains a disproportionately 
high share of seats because of the country’s electoral 
system. Thus, it continually receives official electoral 
funding that is several times greater than its nearest 
challenger (Hoffman and Robinson 2009; Therkildsen 
and Bourgouin 2012).
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Equally as important, CCM under Presidents Mwinyi 
and Mkapa moved quickly to bring business people 
into the party to finance election campaigns once 
they had taken the decision to embrace multi-party 
electoral competition (Hoffman and Robinson 2009; 
Tilley 2014; Whitehead 2012). This was combined 
with strategic management of the privatisation of 
state enterprises during the 1990s, so as to create a 
large pool of business people with allegiance to CCM 
(Therkildsen and Bourgouin 2012; Tilley 2014). It had 
dramatic consequences for the character of the party, 
which will be explored further below. However, it also 
undermined the funding base of opposition parties 
from the start. It should be remembered that, prior to 
economic liberalisation, there were relatively few large 
private enterprises within an economy run on socialist 
principles, so there were few concentrations of non-
state capital that could be mobilised by opposition 
parties (Whitfield et al. 2015).
 
The second dimension is CCM’s superior organisational 
capacity. During the one-party state era, state and 
party structures were intertwined at all levels from 
village (and even neighbourhoods within villages) to 
central government. A formal separation between 
the two accompanied the shift to multi-party 
electoral competition. However, CCM has retained its 
organisational structure at all levels, such that each 
village still has a CCM branch with party officers, with 
successive tiers of organisation at ward, district, regional 
and national levels. In practical terms, this means that 
CCM has unrivalled ability to campaign and reach 
voters. Opposition parties have organised impressive 
rallies in urban centres, where they have found it easier 
to organise, but CCM can get its message out to every 
corner of the country (Makamba 2015; Whitehead 
2012). Conversely, in a 2008 survey of rural voters, 
O’Gorman (2012) found that frequency of access to 
newspapers and radio plus membership of a farmers’ 
organisation – three possible indicators of awareness 
of policy and politics outside of the home location – all 
reduced the probability of respondents voting for CCM.
Moreover, informally, CCM structures remain 
intertwined with the parallel state structures. Regional 
commissioners (RCs) and district commissioners 
(DCs) are key figures here. Formally, they are the 
President’s appointed representatives in their respective 
administrative areas. They are charged with ensuring 
that his will is carried out, acting as his eyes and ears in 
these areas and also exercising control over the security 
services there. Because all presidents have been from 
CCM, RCs and DCs tend also to be CCM members.7 
Thus, they are sometimes observed to act to promote 
CCM in their areas, including using their control over 
security to confer preferential treatment to CCM in 
the holding of election rallies (Hoffman and Robinson 
2009) and availing state resources, such as vehicles, 
for use in CCM campaigns at election time. Hoffman 
and Robinson (2009) also offer a long list of ways in 
which DCs may use their influence over the district 
executive director – the most senior civil servant in the 
district administration – to generate revenue for CCM or 
intimidate supporters or funders of opposition parties.
 
Similarly, at village level, village officers (village executive 
officer, village chairman), whose positions are ultimately 
endorsed by the DC, tend to be party members and 
often work closely with officers from the party branch. In 
this way party officials can, for example, exert influence 
over the granting of land within the village (Therkildsen 
2011).
 
Thirdly, founding President Julius Nyerere was careful to 
build CCM as a party that embraced all ethnicities and 
religions – the logical corollary of his broader nation-
building efforts in an era when party and state were 
intertwined. This means that there are no major social 
groups who are collectively disaffected with CCM, so as 
to form the basis for opposition mobilisation (Whitehead 
2012). Nyerere had a hard time persuading the peoples 
of northern Tanzania (Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Manyara) 
of the merits of CCM’s socialist policies during the one-
party state era, and these regions have subsequently 
provided a modest base for some opposition parties. 
Nevertheless, CCM has significant support even in 
these regions.8 
Similarly, in the early post-independence years, the 
state (and hence also CCM) exerted its control over the 
few existing civil society groups such as the cooperative 
movement that could have provided an independent 
basis for political mobilisation. Thus, when multi-party 
electoral competition was introduced, there were no 
significant independent civil society groups that could 
provide a mobilising platform for opposition politicians 
(Gray 2015).
Fourthly, CCM’s hegemonic position has a self-
sustaining dynamic. Among the rural population, in 
particular, the party’s pervasive presence – in contrast 
to the majority of opposition parties in any given area 
– gives it a degree of credibility, even when it does 
not perform to expectations (O’Gorman 2012). As a 
result, disappointed rural voters may still find a change 
message from a CCM candidate more persuasive than 
the claims of untested and perhaps largely unknown 
opposition candidates.9 Equally as important, people 
with political ambition may weigh up their chances of 
winning an election by fighting for a CCM candidature 
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versus taking on the CCM electoral machine as an 
opposition politician – and many opt for the former 
route.
Given these advantages, CCM hegemony has been 
maintained with little recourse to overt coercion, except 
on Zanzibar (Whitehead 2012). However, coercion has 
not been entirely absent (Hoffman and Robinson 2009; 
Jennings 2016). New laws, which critics argue represent 
a serious challenge to freedom of speech (Kabwe 2017; 
McNeish 2015), presented ahead of the 2015 election, 
may signal CCM’s willingness to play a tougher game if 
the strength of the opposition challenge increases. The 
party’s actions on Zanzibar, where its hold on power 
has been threatened since the introduction of multi-
party electoral competition, also indicate its willingness 
to use more coercive tactics if necessary. 
3.1  Where does agricultural policy   
 fit into this?
CCM’s electoral hegemony is based on its rural support. 
In the past two elections the major gains made by 
opposition parties have come in urban areas.
The previous section argued that the main reason why 
CCM remains so dominant in rural areas is its superior 
reach into rural space as a result of its superior funding 
and its organisational capacity. This in turn gives the 
party a credibility that is difficult for opposition parties to 
establish.10 Historically, the party has sought to reinforce 
this by emphasising that, in the tradition of founding 
President Nyerere, it has established peace and 
stability in the country. Turning to opposition politicians, 
it argues, could jeopardise this. 
Because it has so many organisational advantages, 
to date CCM has not had to deliver much to rural 
voters to retain their votes. This is reflected in the 
mixed picture presented in Table 2.11 Moreover, when 
the party has addressed genuine rural development 
concerns, some observers have discerned a tendency 
to prioritise investment in social sectors. Long before 
the advent of multi-party democracy, this was seen 
clearly in the policy of Ujamaa villagisation, whereby 
rural populations were concentrated in large village 
centres for ease of delivery of social services (schools, 
health posts) at the expense of locating them too far 
from their fields for them to cultivate them properly. 
Predictably, agricultural production suffered as a result 
(Coulson 2013). For example, in the cashew producing 
regions of the south, farmers neglected the pruning of 
their more distant cashew trees, which then created 
the conditions for the spread of powdery mildew fungal 
disease that eventually threatened the productivity of 
the entire industry (Poulton 1998). Prior to structural 
adjustment the CCM government also heavily taxed 
Tanzanian agriculture, principally through exchange 
rate overvaluation (Anderson and Masters 2009). 
Reinforcing the phenomenon of urban bias observed 
in much of Africa, Bates (1989) linked this specifically 
to the origins of the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) post-independence elite in urban areas 
and semi-arid rural areas, where social services were 
accorded higher priority than agricultural development. 
By contrast, the post-independence elite in Kenya were 
better-off farmers from the high-potential agricultural 
lands of central Kenya and accorded much higher 
priority to agricultural policy. In the end, however, 
agricultural taxation resulted in food shortages in urban 
Tanzania, such that even the urban middle class could 
understand the need to restore incentives to farmers 
through structural adjustment (Lofchie 1994).
Of course, agricultural neglect has never been official 
policy. By contrast, since the Nyerere era there has 
been a steady stream of politicised agricultural slogans, 
reflecting the fact that most Tanzanians live in rural areas. 
These have included ‘ukulima wa kisasa’ (‘modern 
agriculture’), ‘siasa ni kilimo’ (‘politics is agriculture’), 
‘kilimo ni uhai’ (‘agriculture is life’), ‘kilimo cha kufa na 
kupona’ (‘agriculture as a matter of life and death’) and, 
more recently, Kilimo Kwanza’ (‘agriculture first’). The 
problem has been that these have tended to substitute 
for effective policy rather than to motivate it (Cooksey 
2014; Coulson 2013; Lofchie 2014).
In the early 2000s it is possible that donor priorities, 
linked to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
reinforced any domestic tendency towards favouring 
health and education spending.12 However, from the 
outset of his presidency, Jakaya Kikwete recognised 
the importance of paying attention to agriculture. At 
the end of 2005, while he was still president-in-waiting, 
Kikwete intervened in the final preparations for the new 
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) – 
the centrepiece for government–donor cooperation 
on agriculture – to raise the target for investment 
in smallholder irrigation facilities from 25,000ha per 
year to a total of 1million hectares over the five years 
of the programme (Therkildsen 2011). In 2007 he 
invited the Gatsby Charitable Foundation to work with 
the Tanzania Cotton Board and Ministry of Trade and 
Industries to revitalise the cotton and textile industries 
in the country (Coles, Ellis and Shepherd 2011). In 
2007/08, taking inspiration from the Malawi Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme, a voucher-based fertiliser subsidy 
programme was piloted in two districts in Tanzania.13 
With additional urgency provided by the increases in 
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international food and fertiliser prices in 2007/08, the 
National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) was 
scaled up to 53 districts for the 2008/09 season, with 
assistance from the World Bank, and was nationwide 
by 2009/10 (Government of Tanzania et al. 2013; Kato 
2016; Mather et al. 2016). 
In August 2009 President Kikwete launched Kilimo 
Kwanza, a policy vision for a more commercialised 
agriculture sector that was developed in conjunction 
with the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC). 
In 2010–11, plans for a Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) were launched as an 
expression of the commercial vision of Kilimo Kwanza 
(Cooksey 2014; Smalley, Sulle and Mahale 2014). 
President Kikwete was personally active in encouraging 
international investors to invest in the Tanzanian 
agricultural sector and specifically within the SAGCOT 
region (Cooksey 2014; Elinaza 2012).
Towards the end of his tenure, President Kikwete 
championed an initiative called Big Results Now, 
inspired by the Malaysian development experience; it 
was intended to enhance public service delivery across 
six key sectors, including agriculture. Within agriculture, 
priority was given to rice, maize and sugar – the latter 
in particular designed to give added impetus to the 
direction set out by Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT. 
Several of these initiatives are discussed in more detail 
in section 5.
Political considerations clearly motivated or influenced 
several of the initiatives. For example, Kilimo Kwanza 
quickly became a slogan at political rallies during the 
2010 election campaign (Cooksey 2014). Expenditure 
on NAIVS peaked in the 2010/11 season, allocating 
vouchers to as many voters as possible just before 
the election. NAIVS had originally been conceived as 
a programme to promote maize and rice in targeted 
high-potential production regions, but was extended 
nationwide in response to requests from politicians in 
other parts of the country (Government of Tanzania et 
al. 2013; Kato 2016; Mather et al. 2016).
On the other hand, as in previous eras, the rhetoric 
ran ahead of the delivery. NAIVS is widely regarded 
as an effective programme (Government of Tanzania 
et al. 2013; Mather et al. 2016), although there have 
also been dissenting voices (Kato 2016; Pan and 
Christiaensen 2012). However, the politically revised 
plans for irrigated rice expansion under ASDS did 
not translate into increased coverage on the ground 
(Therkildsen 2011). The introduction of contract farming 
into the cotton sector – the centrepiece of the plan to 
revitalise the industry – was obstructed for several years 
by opposition from within CCM, despite both President 
Kikwete and later his Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda 
publicly backing it. Agriculture’s share of total public 
expenditure peaked at 6.4 percent in 2009/10 – the 
year leading up to the 2010 election – and has declined 
since (Government of Tanzania et al. 2013). This is well 
below the target of 10 percent that African Heads of 
State committed to achieve in the Maputo Declaration 
of 2003 and recommitted to achieving at Malabo just 
over a decade later (Assembly of the African Union 
2003; The Heads of States and Government of the 
African Union 2014). Progress with SAGCOT has been 
slower than anticipated (Byiers, Bizzotto Molina and 
Engel 2016). While Big Results Now is reported to have 
achieved some successes in the water, education, and 
transport sectors, the same does not appear to be true 
of its agriculture efforts (Department for International 
Development (DFID) 2016).
The limited share of public expenditure devoted to 
agriculture may be an indication that CCM, or some 
within it, still do not believe that the sector is critical to 
the party retaining its hold on power. Rural votes can 
still be relied upon even without high performance in the 
agriculture sector. However, as will be discussed below, 
a more persuasive reason for the limited delivery, relative 
to rhetoric, during the Kikwete administration was that 
the increasingly fragmented distribution of power within 
CCM made it difficult to achieve policy coherence or 
discipline and thereby undermined delivery. In turn, this 
may have discouraged the channelling of too many 
resources to the agricultural sector.
Certainly, the initiatives described above do not 
represent a coherent policy set, but rather the jostling 
of competing interests around the agricultural sector. 
One key tension that emerged during the Kikwete era 
was between investment in smallholder agriculture – 
emphasised, for example, in ASDS and attempts to 
revive the cotton sector – and encouragement for larger-
scale private14 agricultural enterprises (emphasised, 
for example, in Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT). In 
turn, these larger-scale agricultural enterprises can 
be differentiated into the growing number of medium-
scale farms owned largely by middle class, urban-
based Tanzanians (Jayne et al. 2016) and large-scale 
production and processing enterprises owned by both 
Tanzanian and international companies. Another tension 
that affected policy implementation more than formal 
policymaking was between businesses that wished to 
invest in agricultural production within Tanzania on the 
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one hand and trading enterprises that profit from the 
importation of agricultural commodities on the other. 
Thus, while appeals to rural voters suggest policies that 
support smallholder agricultural development, other 
powerful forces also exert an influence over both the 
design and implementation of policy.
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THE RISE Of MEDIUM-SCALE 
AND LARgE-SCALE fARMS IN 
TANZANIA
4.
Particularly during the tenure of President Kikwete, 
medium- and large-scale farms have acquired greater 
prominence within Tanzanian agriculture. This section 
discusses the reasons for their rise and considers the 
implications for smallholder farmers.
4.1  Large-scale farming in    
 Tanzania
Tanzania has a mixed history with large-scale farming. 
The unsuccessful groundnut scheme in the south of 
the country is a well-known example from the colonial 
era (Tyler 2007a). Some large-scale state farms were 
developed by Julius Nyerere’s socialist government and 
the nationalisation of the country’s European-owned sisal 
estates in 1967 represented the largest nationalisation 
of agricultural enterprises by any post-independence 
state in Africa (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013). However, 
many state farms encountered financial difficulties, 
so were later sold or leased to private investors. One 
example here is the two adjacent farms that comprise 
the core estate of Kilombero Sugar Company Limited 
(KSCL). These were privatised in 1997/98, with Illovo 
acquiring the main equity stake while the Tanzanian 
government retained a 20 percent shareholding. A 
second example is Mngeta Farm, which now forms the 
core rice production estate for Kilombero Plantations 
Limited. This was developed for the Tanzanian state 
through North Korean financial and technical support, 
but quickly ceased to function when the Koreans left 
in 1993 (Mung’ong’o and Kayonko 2009). After a first 
attempt to lease the site to private investors proved 
unsuccessful, it was leased to Kilombero Plantations 
Limited in 2008.
Baglioni and Gibbon (2013) argue that, while many 
state farms in Africa were offered for sale or lease as 
part of 1990s privatisation programmes, demand for 
such investments only took off in the first decade of 
the new millennium. The acquisition of large tracts of 
land for agricultural production then gained additional 
impetus as investors sought to capitalise on higher 
food and fuel prices post-2008. The early exception 
of Illovo’s acquisition of Kilombero Sugar Company 
notwithstanding, this pattern is also observed in 
Tanzania. Schoneveld (2014) records that 47 projects15 
involving land of 2,000 hectares or more successfully 
completed their land transactions (mainly leases) in 
Tanzania in the period 2005-13. These comprised 
about 600,000 hectares of land. Taking a much smaller 
minimum size for large-scale farms of 100 hectares, 
Jayne et al. (2016) report that large-scale farms in the 
country own or control around 1.29 million hectares. 
Thus, large-scale farms account for around 8 percent 
of farmland currently occupied in Tanzania.
As already noted, prominent large-scale investments 
have been made in sugar and rice, which are two of the 
largest food import items in the country, after wheat.16 
The Land Matrix database, which concentrates 
on international investors, also notes large-scale 
production activities within Tanzania in a range of other 
cereals, fruit and vegetables, oil palm, teak, coffee and 
livestock.17 
While there has been increased investor interest in 
large-scale agricultural production, the scale of large-
scale land acquisitions is put in perspective by the area 
of land now occupied by medium-scale farms (see 
below). Pedersen (2016) argues that Tanzania’s 1999 
Village Land Act has given communities the ability to 
defend their rights to land and that this has slowed the 
transfer of land to large-scale investors. Many large-
scale land acquisitions to date have been former state 
farms, rather than land designated as ‘village land’ 
(see below). Business interests seeking to promote 
large-scale agricultural investments see the procedural 
difficulties in acquiring village land as a flaw in the 
current system.
Meanwhile, comparing inventories of large-scale land 
deals (of 1,000+ hectares) in Ethiopia, Ghana and 
Tanzania, Cotula et al. (2014) observe that most of 
the investors in Tanzania have come from Europe and 
the United States, with very few from Tanzania itself. 
This lack of domestic investors in large-scale land 
deals contrasts with their findings in both Ethiopia and 
Ghana. While they recognise that missing data could 
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distort the picture, an alternative explanation is that 
there are few domestic – and especially Tanzanian 
African – investors with the capacity to manage large-
scale farm enterprises. This would be consistent with 
the observations of Whitfield et al. (2015) on the relative 
weakness of the domestic capitalist class in Tanzania, 
plus the observation (see below) that many enterprises 
with access to large quantities of capital in Tanzania are 
fundamentally trading enterprises.
4.2  The rise of medium-scale farms
According to Jayne et al. (2016), medium-scale farms 
(defined as being 5-100 hectares in size) occupy 5.86 
million hectares of land in Tanzania. This is almost 
five times as much land as large-scale farms and 
surprisingly close to the 8.59 million hectares found 
within smallholder farms (defined as being 0-5 hectares 
in size). Even more striking is the apparent rate of growth 
in the number of such farms. According to that study, 
there was an almost 40 percent increase in the number 
of farms of 5-100 hectares in size in the four years after 
the international food price spike (i.e. 2008-12).
These farms comprise both the holdings of wealthier 
members of traditional smallholder communities 
and new enterprises established by urban-based 
investors, including large numbers of civil servants, for 
the specific purpose of making money. Even without 
the international food price spike, demand for food 
products is growing steadily as a result of increasing 
urbanisation in Tanzania (see Table 2) and increasing 
incomes within these urban centres.
4.3  Economic and political    
 dynamics
Are large- and medium-scale farms fundamentally 
in competition with smallholders or are there 
complementarities between them? There are arguments 
both ways (Table 3). Smallholders are geographically 
dispersed and typically poor and with low levels of 
education. Thus, their views are rarely heard directly in 
policy debates – a factor that has contributed to the 
neglect of smallholder agriculture in Tanzania described 
earlier. Owners of large-scale and perhaps also medium-
scale farms may be more effective in arguing for policies 
that are supportive or protective of agriculture. Where 
the policies advocated primarily concern provision of 
public goods, then this will also benefit smallholders. 
Where they concern private goods, however, advocacy 
by large- and medium-scale farm owners may 
advantage themselves at the expense of smallholders. 
Arguably, this is most likely where medium-scale farms 
are concerned.
Similarly, large-scale farm owners may be able to 
negotiate improvements in local infrastructure, such as 
feeder roads or electricity, in exchange for establishing 
their farms, and these may have spillover benefits for 
local smallholders. Conceivably, medium-scale farms 
could also exert such local bargaining power, but only 
where a critical mass of medium-scale farms existed in 
a particular locality.
Large-scale farms with processing facilities or high-value 
marketing contracts may also offer services (technical 
advice, input provision, credit) to local smallholders 
through outgrower (contract farming) schemes. This 
is part of the official SAGCOT vision. Medium-scale 
farms are unlikely to have either the financial means or 
incentive to do this.
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Conversely, where land and market access are 
concerned, large- and medium-scale farms are 
essentially competitors. Because Tanzania remains a 
relatively land-abundant country, one might assume 
that competition for land is not yet acute. However, as 
Jayne, Chamberlin and Headey (2014) have argued 
(for Africa more generally), populations are unevenly 
distributed within countries, such that scarcity of land 
can be observed in particular regions – especially those 
with better infrastructure and higher agro-ecological 
potential – even of land-abundant countries. 
Competition for land may also reflect competition 
for the accompanying water resources. In Tanzania, 
competition for land and water in the south west and 
south of the country has intensified in recent years, with 
smallholder and large-scale agriculture (including the 
SAGCOT zone), livestock and conservation (wetlands 
and other important habitats) coming into conflict. To 
date, it has been Maasai and Sukuma pastoralists, 
originally from the north and west of the country 
respectively (but some of whom have been present 
in the areas of contention for one to two generations), 
who have found themselves increasingly squeezed by 
competing resource users (Mwamfupe 2015; Nindi 
et al. 2014; Odgaard 2006). Access to land for crop 
agriculture is discussed further below.
The relative competitiveness of large-scale versus 
smallholder farmers in crop output markets has been 
a topic of long-standing academic and policy interest 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). Baglioni and 
Gibbon (2013) observe several waves of large-scale 
farming investment in Africa, including in Tanzania, 
but argue that these have often been followed by a 
subsequent retreat into a smaller range of crops where 
large-scale farms sustained a competitive advantage 
over smallholders. In recent years, export horticulture 
has been the primary example of this. Poulton et al. 
(2008) argue that, across Africa, large-scale farms have 
demonstrated a competitive advantage, inter alia, in 
export horticulture and sugar, while smallholders have 
maintained dominance in cereals and cotton.
In Tanzania, large-scale farms are engaged in the 
production of a range of commodities (see above). 
However, these include commodities for which the 
country is a large net importer, such as rice and sugar, 
as well as export horticulture, which has grown through 
large-scale investment. Thus, one could argue that the 
degree of output market competition with smallholders 
is currently modest. There is much less available 
information regarding medium-scale farms. To the 
extent that they produce similar crops to smallholders 
using similar production technologies and marketing 
channels, they are competitors. They are responding 
to growing demand in Tanzania’s urban markets, but 
are thereby reducing the opportunities for smallholder 
commercialisation.
In light of these observations, plus the observation 
that appeals to rural voters should suggest policies 
in support of smallholder agricultural development, 
what reasons can be advanced for the rise of large-





Lobbying on policy (e.g. 
protection against imports)
Yes, where policy concerns public goods; may be 
competitive where policy concerns private good 
distribution (e.g. subsidised fertiliser or tractors)
Securing local public 
investment (e.g. road 
upgrading) from government 
or donors
Possibly, but only if there is a critical mass of medium-
scale farmers within a given locality





Land access Land access
Competition in output 
markets
Yes; may be stronger than for large-scale farms to the 
extent that medium-scale farms produce similar crops 
using similar production technologies and marketing 
channels to smallholders
Source: Author’s own.
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scale and especially medium-scale farms in Tanzania 
in recent years? One hypothesis is that politicians 
are concerned that rapidly growing urban centres 
should be fed and food prices kept as low and stable 
as possible. Food shortages in urban centres prior 
to structural adjustment were one of the factors that 
challenged CCM’s legitimacy in the eyes of the nascent 
middle class as well as poor urban workers. A second 
is that large- and medium-scale farms are not perceived 
in policy circles to be in competition with smallholders. 
As noted above, the picture here is mixed. Meanwhile, 
narratives regarding contract farming can strengthen 
the belief that complementarities can prevail.
A third hypothesis is that senior politicians doubt the 
capacity of their own government machinery to deliver 
the infrastructure investment and support services 
necessary to stimulate broad-based smallholder 
agricultural growth. Thus, while they publicly cooperate 
with international donor agencies in high-profile 
programmes such as ASDS and NAIVS, they have also 
increasingly reached out to other actors, including the 
large-scale private sector, to deliver agricultural growth 
(Cooksey 2012). 
One of the attractions to policymakers of large-scale 
agriculture is that it requires less state support than 
smallholder development (Deininger and Byerlee 2012; 
Poulton, Dorward and Kydd 2010). In Tanzania, a 
process of decentralisation has given local government 
administrations, especially districts, greater responsibility 
for the implementation of key national policies. Yet local 
accountability remains a weak driver for service delivery. 
Meanwhile, the process of democratisation has made 
the central organs of CCM increasingly dependent on 
the lower tiers of the party (regional, district, ward and 
village elites) for mobilising votes. It has been argued 
that this, plus changes to the process of candidate 
selection, has strengthened the bargaining power of 
these local elites, with the result that they claim an 
increasing share of rents from major development 
programmes in exchange for their services. The 
consequence is that the power of the centre (CCM 
and hence government agencies) to discipline local 
administrations so as to deliver effective services to 
rural citizens has been diminished (Therkildsen 2011; 
Therkildsen and Bourgouin 2012).
Finally, the rise of medium-scale farms appears to 
represent the uncoordinated responses of numerous 
citizens, of above-average but not necessarily large 
means, to expanding market opportunities. Many 
bureaucrats and politicians have been attracted by 
these opportunities, but there are few monopoly rents 
associated with medium-scale farming, so there has 
been little pressure to restrict the ability of others to 
access them.
4.4  Land acquisition
Access to, and use of, land are fundamental to rural 
livelihoods. This includes not just land for cultivation, 
but for livestock grazing and gathering of a wide range 
of common pool resources. Most uses of land are 
seasonal and some, such as gathering of wild foods, 
may occur primarily in years of inadequate rainfall for 
most crop cultivation. International evidence indicates 
that it is often the poorest who rely most heavily on 
common pool resources for their livelihoods and 
survival (Beck and Nesmith 2001; Cavendish 1999; 
Jodha 1995).
According to Alden Wily (2011: 744), Tanzania 
represents a ‘best practice case’ in Africa regarding 
protection of common property rights, with the system 
of ‘formalized, democratized and legally acknowledged 
community-based government’ (Ibid.: 747) central 
to this. In Tanzania, the majority of land – officially 
estimated at around 70 percent (Mbilinyi 2016a) – is 
designated as ‘village land’. Under the 1999 Village 
Land Act, this land is vested in the village council, 
which allocates it to community members for their use. 
Village land that is not allocated to individuals in this 
way remains as common land, supplying common pool 
goods to community members.
There is, nevertheless, a long history of tension 
between the state and communities over control of 
land in Tanzania. This is rooted in the claim, made since 
the start of the colonial period, that all land is ultimately 
vested in the state. Using this power, the programme 
of Ujamaa villagisation removed many rural households 
from their homes and lands18 and also created new 
state claims to land that were in conflict with pre-
existing community claims. The 1999 Act strengthened 
local control over land, but the state still retains the right 
to acquire village land (with appropriate compensation) 
for broader developmental purposes.
Villages can grant portions of their village land to 
outsiders. The simplest case is where an individual 
village member wishes to sell or rent land that they 
have been given for cultivation to a fellow Tanzanian 
from outside the village. Such private land transactions 
do not need third party approval. However, the buyer 
will generally still go to the village council to secure 
assurance that the transfer is recognised. 
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Where village common land is involved, the village 
council negotiates with the investor in question and 
the decision is presented for approval by the full village 
assembly – i.e. all community members aged 18 or 
above. Transactions involving less than 250 hectares 
are handled entirely at village level, but transactions 
larger than this have to be approved by the district 
council too. 
Foreigners are not allowed to acquire village land. 
However, village land can be reclassified (by the 
President) as general land, at which point the Ministry 
of Lands can issue a ‘granted right of occupancy’ 
(essentially a lease of 33, 66 or 99 years) to the investor. 
This only happens once the steps outlined above 
have been completed and the Commissioner of Land 
confirms that fair compensation has been paid to all 
within the village who are entitled to it (Sulle and Nelson 
2009).
The rapid rise of medium-scale farms since 1999 
indicates that these procedures are not an impediment 
to urban-based Tanzanian investors who wish to acquire 
plots of land for agricultural enterprises. Such people 
may have connections with the village in question, but, 
even if not, neither the procedural nor cultural barriers 
to completing a land transaction are particularly great. 
Some villages have given out thousands of hectares, 
albeit in parcels of less than 250 hectares (Sulle, pers.
comm.). 
By contrast, there are those both in government and 
within financial institutions that would like to finance 
large-scale agricultural investments who believe 
that these procedures are unduly cumbersome for 
large-scale and particularly foreign investors (Mbilinyi 
2016b; Pedersen 2016; Sulle and Nelson 2009). For 
such investors, acquiring a lease to a suitable piece of 
land can take two years or more. This was one driver 
behind the drafting of a new Land Policy, commenced 
in 2016, that seeks to protect communities’ rights over 
village land while also streamlining procedures for land 
acquisition for large-scale investment in areas such as 
the SAGCOT zone. 
However, the draft policy in turn has raised concerns 
among researchers and activists. While the 
responsibilities vested in village councils are progressive 
and unusual in Africa, the system is not perfect. The 
councils tend to be male-dominated (Mbilinyi 2016c). 
Members often have limited information about 
potential buyers of their land, so may be persuaded to 
approve dubious deals negotiated by village leaders. 
Large investors may come accompanied by district 
officials, promising schools or other projects that never 
materialise (Sulle and Nelson 2009). Despite the fact 
that full compensation is enshrined in law, there is no 
appeals system for community members who believe 
they have not received adequate compensation (Sulle 
et al. 2016). Indeed, Sulle et al. (2016) argue that 
displaced people should receive shares in the resulting 
land-based investments, rather than simply receiving a 
one-off payment and losing all claims to the land.
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This section briefly summarises and comments upon 
major agricultural strategy documents and initiatives 
produced since 2000, highlighting the different positions 
with regard to agricultural commercialisation that they 
represent. It shows that agricultural policy has been 
heavily contested throughout the period 2000–2015. 
Narratives emphasising the importance of agricultural 
commercialisation and the benefits of stimulating 
greater commercial investment in the sector have 
featured prominently throughout the period, provoking 
resistance from some within government who have 
continued to favour a central role for state interventions 
in stimulating agricultural growth. 
Of equal interest, however, are the rationales for 
stimulating greater commercial investment in the 
sector, which have to be inferred from the various 
strategy documents and initiatives. Donors have 
formally championed commercialisation as a means 
to stimulating smallholder agricultural growth and 
ultimately reducing poverty in predominantly rural 
Tanzania, although some argue that they are also (more) 
interested in leveraging new market opportunities for 
agribusinesses and multinational corporations based in 
their countries of origin. At the same time, Tanzanian 
business interests have become increasingly influential 
in promoting a vision of agricultural transformation in 
which medium- and large-scale farms grow alongside 
smallholders, to the direct benefit of entrepreneurially 
minded Tanzanians of diverse means, but with the 
anticipated impacts on the poorest less clearly spelled 
out.
5.1  The Agricultural Sector    
 Development Strategy (2001)
The ASDS was formulated to drive forward the agenda 
of Tanzania’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) within the agricultural sector. It was, therefore, 
an appropriately donor-friendly document that set out a 
limited vision for the Tanzanian state (‘policy formulation, 
the establishment of a regulatory framework to reduce 
transaction costs, the provision of public goods including 
a favourable enabling environment and the provision of 
safety nets for the most vulnerable in society’) (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2001: 16), so as to create space 
for greater commercial private sector participation. 
The objectives of the strategy were framed in terms of 
poverty reduction, food security and economic growth, 
with the interdependent processes of commercialisation 
and enhancing productivity central to the vision of how 
these goals were to be achieved.
Both domestic and export market opportunities were 
recognised, as was an ‘abundance of unutilised land’ 
(ibid.: vi). In what is perhaps a revealing glimpse into the 
mindset of national agricultural experts and bureaucrats, 
lack of labour-saving technology was identified as the 
main factor constraining smallholders to cultivate small 
areas of land for semi-subsistence purposes. No trade-
off was observed between supporting smallholders to 
expand their production and the development of large-
scale agriculture. Rather, the ASDS noted the potential 
for smallholders to benefit from partnerships with 
emerging agribusiness firms and large-scale farms. 
The ASDS clearly identified the private sector as the 
critical driver of agricultural growth. The appropriate 
role of the public sector was to create a stable 
macroeconomic environment so as to encourage 
private sector investment and to provide – or, given 
recognised resource constraints, to support the 
provision of – services designed to raise the productivity 
of smallholders.19 However, the existing legislative and 
institutional frameworks did not reflect this division 
of roles, which weakened incentives for commercial 
private investment. In particular, a number of commodity 
boards had broad and ill-defined mandates20 and were 
insufficiently accountable to value chain stakeholders. 
A review of crop boards was listed as a priority action 
under the PRSP and was eventually undertaken with 
World Bank and European Union support in 2004/05. 
Restrictions on cross-border trade were identified as a 
disincentive to commercial investment – still an issue 
more than a decade later (Wilson and Lewis 2015) – 
and attention was also drawn to the tax regime for 
agriculture. High interest rates on commercial bank 
loans to agriculture and high energy prices were both 
identified as discouraging commercial investment in 
agriculture. 
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Finally, there was a need to ‘streamline procedures 
for legal access to land’ (United Republic of Tanzania 
2001: viii). ‘The lack of legal and physical access to 
land [despite the stated land abundance] is a major 
hindrance to entry of medium and large-scale farmers 
into agriculture’ (ibid.: 30). The implementation of the 
1999 Land Act was to be monitored to see whether it 
improved this access.
The ASDS recognised that there were ‘politically difficult 
aspects of the strategy’ (ibid.: vii). Coming less than 
a decade after the phasing out of fertiliser subsidies, 
some still regarded subsidies, rather than greater 
engagement with remunerative market opportunities, 
as the way to stimulate smallholder productivity. At the 
same time, there was a temptation to offer subsidies 
to favoured agribusinesses to encourage their 
investment, rather than focusing on the creation of an 
enabling environment for all investors. There was also 
a reluctance on the part of central government to be 
restricted to a policymaking role and to cede the central 
role in (supporting) service delivery to local government 
(ibid.: 16-17). These acknowledgements provide clues 
to the fact that the ASDS approach to the respective 
roles of state and private sector was not universally 
accepted within the Tanzanian government. 
According to Therkildsen (2011: 16), some of the 
debates that were suppressed during the formulation 
of the ASDS resurfaced during the preparation of the 
Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP). 
Central government ministries sought to expand their 
role within the ASDP relative to both the private sector 
and local government.21 In both cases the ministries’ 
positions were in tension with the preferences of the 
ASDP’s major donors. This is one reason why the ASDP 
was not launched until 2006. Combined with the political 
intervention of President Kikwete to dramatically raise 
the priority attached to irrigation investment, the final 
version of the ASDP focused more on state actions than 
had the ASDS, albeit still leaving much responsibility for 
implementation in the hands of local governments.
5.2  Kilimo Kwanza (2009)
The Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) initiative was 
developed under the auspices of the Tanzania National 
Business Council (TNBC) – a forum for public–private 
dialogue chaired by the President of Tanzania22 – with 
the active involvement of the Agricultural Council of 
Tanzania (ACT).23 It was endorsed by President Kikwete 
in August 2009 at an event in Dodoma celebrating 
Farmers’ Week.
According to Cooksey (2014), the development of 
Kilimo Kwanza was in part a response by the Tanzanian 
business community to the state-led nature of the ASDP. 
Its nature as a public–private initiative was contrasted 
with the centrally planned and largely government-driven 
ASDP. The content of Kilimo Kwanza was developed 
during a series of district workshops run by ACT during 
2006-07, zonal workshops organised by TNBC and the 
National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) in 
2008, and a local investor’s roundtable.
Since the commencement of the ASDP, world food 
prices had risen dramatically, accentuating the 
opportunities for profit within the Tanzanian agricultural 
sector. It supported the principle of domestic agricultural 
production in place of imports (using tariff protection if 
necessary) and argued for the establishment and/or 
revitalisation of domestic agro-processing industries 
and against the export of agricultural raw materials. 
Kilimo Kwanza argued that Tanzania’s agriculture sector 
needed to be modernised and commercialised, as a 
precondition for the wider structural transformation of 
the economy.24 It noted the low use of improved seeds, 
fertilisers and crop protection chemicals in Tanzania, 
and the correspondingly low yields of major crops – 
all phenomena that input supply companies could 
address – as well as the need to revive local supply of 
agricultural machinery and implements. 
The second of Kilimo Kwanza‘s ten pillars drew attention 
to the need for greater financing for various activities 
within agricultural value chains in the country. This 
included both public and commercial finance. It argued 
for the 2003 Maputo Declaration target of 10 percent of 
the national budget to be dedicated to agriculture and 
specifically highlighted the need for greater investment 
in rural infrastructure and in irrigation. It suggested that 
7 million hectares of land should be irrigated by 2015 
– an aspiration way in excess of the politically inflated 
target of 1 million that was introduced into the ASDP. 
While even the 1 million hectare target had not been 
achieved by 2015, a Kilimo Kwanza recommendation 
that did come to pass was the establishment of a 
Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (established in 
August 2015).
Kilimo Kwanza, therefore, promoted the interests of 
entrepreneurially minded Tanzanians; not necessarily 
the interests of large businesses (although some of 
these were associated with ACT, TNBC and the Kilimo 
Kwanza initiative) but not primarily the interests of poor 
farmers, who for some time to come were likely to face 
multiple constraints to the modernisation of production 
systems that Kilimo Kwanza envisaged. It argued 
that agricultural transformation could (and should) be 
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undertaken by small, medium- and large-scale farms 
alike – continuing the narrative of the ASDS that there 
is no fundamental competition between these multiple 
scales. In practice, this primarily meant expanding 
the opportunities for medium- and large-scale farms, 
and the various agribusinesses that would service 
them, alongside the existing smallholder population. 
Farmer organisations and contract farming should be 
promoted, which would benefit a sub-section of the 
smallholder population, but in practice these could 
also encompass (and may at times primarily benefit) 
medium-scale farms.
Nevertheless, Kilimo Kwanza was also astutely populist. 
The phrase evoked a narrative that the agriculture 
sector had been neglected – to Tanzania’s cost. Former 
President Nyerere’s observations along the same lines 
were quoted to support this position and suggest that 
this was an initiative to benefit all. The ‘home grown’ 
nature of the initiative was highlighted, and Kilimo 
Kwanza argued that ordinary Tanzanians should be 
sensitised to ask what they could do to transform 
agriculture. As such, the slogan Kilimo Kwanza became 
a regular feature of CCM campaign rallies in the run-up 
to the 2010 election.
5.3  The Southern Agricultural   
 Growth Corridor of Tanzania   
 (2010-11)
SAGCOT was initiated at the World Economic Forum 
Africa summit held in Dar es Salaam in May 2010. It 
describes itself as a public–private partnership that 
seeks to ‘ensure the necessary infrastructure, policy 
environment and access to knowledge to create an 
efficient, well-functioning agricultural value chain’ (www.
sagcot.com). The government, alongside supportive 
donors, would invest in the upgrading of transport, 
electricity supply and other infrastructure in the SAGCOT 
zone, which covers around one-third of the country, 
while seeking to encourage private investors to develop 
agricultural production and processing enterprises 
there. By 2030, SAGCOT aims to have mobilised 
US$3.5 billion in public and private investment, so as 
to bring 350,000 hectares of (new25) land into profitable 
production, creating 420,000 jobs, involving 100,000 
commercial smallholders and lifting 2 million people 
out of poverty (SAGCOT Centre Ltd 2015). SAGCOT’s 
strategy centres on the development of investment 
clusters. In 2015, six clusters were identified for 
infrastructure upgrading and investment promotion.
SAGCOT seeks to attract both domestic and 
international investment into agricultural production 
and processing investments in the SAGCOT zone. 
ACT describes SAGCOT as ‘the first programme 
for implementation of Kilimo Kwanza’ and is proud 
of its contribution to the establishment and ongoing 
implementation of SAGCOT (http://actanzania.or.tz/about-us/
achievements). Since 2011, a SAGCOT Centre has been 
established to oversee the SAGCOT development 
strategy. The SAGCOT Centre board comprises both 
Tanzanian and international members and is chaired by 
an ACT board member. None of the board members 
is either a Tanzanian government employee or donor 
representative, but a former official from the Ministry of 
Agriculture is the Chief Executive Officer. His deputy has 
a background in promoting international agribusiness.
The SAGCOT Centre has (wisely) spent time developing 
the ‘rules of the game’ that will govern its operations and 
those of investors who are attracted to the SAGCOT 
zone, and consulting with civil society and other groups 
regarding their concerns about an initiative with such a 
grand ambition. These include both social justice and 
environmental concerns, with land and water rights 
central to both of these. 
As of 2015, SAGCOT claimed that 13 projects were 
underway within the zone, comprising ‘close to 100 
active partners’, and that the centre had ‘close to 
US$1bn in committed investment from its partners’ 
(SAGCOT Centre Ltd 2015: 6). SAGCOT is the pre-
eminent initiative for promoting large-scale farming in 
Tanzania and flagship investments reflect this. At the 
same time, inclusion of smallholders and other rural 
households through contract farming schemes and 
employment opportunities is a central part of the official 
SAGCOT vision (Ibid.). It is claimed that ‘around 25,000 
smallholder farmers currently benefit from SAGCOT’s 
initiatives’. What is less clear is where medium-scale 
farms and smaller trading and processing enterprises 
fit into the SAGCOT vision. To what extent will medium-
scale farms compete with smallholders as infrastructure 
and market linkages within the SAGCOT area are 
improved?
5.4  Tanzania Agriculture and Food   
 Security Investment Plan (2011)
In 2010, Tanzania embarked on the process of 
developing an investment plan in accordance with 
the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP). Although the government 
had signed the 2003 Maputo Declaration stating its 
commitment to increase investment in the agriculture 
sector, like most other signatories it had not engaged 
actively with the CAADP process until the world food 
price rises of 2007-08. At the L’Aquila summit in July 
2009, G8 nations announced that US$20 billion in aid to 
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support ‘sustainable agriculture development’ as part 
of their response to the crisis would be used to ‘support 
the implementation of country and regional agricultural 
strategies and plans through country-led coordination 
processes’ (G8 Heads of State and others 2009, para 
10, quoted in Poulton et al. 2014).
Cooksey (2014) describes the process by which the 
ASDP was subsumed under the Tanzania Agriculture 
and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) so as 
to produce a document with sufficiently ambitious 
investment targets and suitable references to food 
security and climate change to satisfy the criteria for 
a CAADP investment plan. The name conveys that 
agricultural commercialisation was not a key theme of 
TAFSIP, although CAADP has increasingly recognised 
the importance of commercialisation alongside 
concerns about food security.
The presentational gymnastics also required that 
TAFSIP finesse the complexities of the relationship 
between the ASDS and Kilimo Kwanza. As the officials 
associated with TAFSIP were similar to those involved in 
the development of the ASDP, Kilimo Kwanza was given 
the somewhat dismissive status of ‘slogan’. According 
to Cooksey (2014), in practice TAFSIP was unlikely to 
make much difference to Tanzanian agricultural policy 
or investment. While many elements of the Kilimo 
Kwanza programme have yet to be implemented (and 
may never be), the fact that it is owned by ACT and 
represents the aspirations of an important constituency 
of entrepreneurially minded and politically connected 
Tanzanians means that it is likely to have a more 
enduring influence.
5.5  Big Results Now (2013)
Like TAFSIP, the influence of Big Results Now on 
the agriculture sector was ephemeral. Inspired by 
Malaysian experience, Big Results Now was an 
initiative endorsed by President Kikwete in early 2013 
to enhance public service delivery so as to accelerate 
policy impact in in six priority sectors: energy, 
agriculture, water, education, transport and mobilisation 
of resources (www.pdb.go.tz). It involved the establishment 
of a Presidential Delivery Bureau within the Office of the 
President, which sought to identify so-called National 
Key Result Area (NKRA) initiatives within each of the 
priority sectors, then to monitor the progress of these 
initiatives. In other words, Big Results Now sought to 
improve prioritisation within policymaking in key sectors 
and then to enhance coordination (across planning, 
budgeting and implementation stages) so as to deliver 
developmental outcomes. The fundamental challenge 
that its prioritisation and coordination efforts faced was 
the increasingly decentralised nature of the Tanzanian 
state and the rent-seeking demands that were made 
within this.
Within the agriculture sector, Big Results Now aimed to 
achieve three key results by 2015/16 (www.pdb.go.tz):
•	 ‘Setting up 25 commercial farming deals for 
paddy and sugarcane
•	 Establishing 78 professionally managed 
collective rice irrigation and marketing 
schemes
•	 Setting up 275 collective warehouse based 
marketing schemes’.
Collectively, these interventions were designed to 
stimulate production of rice, sugar and maize and ‘to 
involve 400,000 smallholder farmers and cover 330,000 
hectares of land for smallholder farming. In addition, 
the NKRA aims to prepare 350,000 hectares of land 
for large-scale farming’ – all by 2015/16 (www.pdb.go.tz). 
This makes the ambition of SAGCOT seem extremely 
modest.
The goals are interesting primarily in terms of the 
interests that they represent. While smallholders are 
the major producers of both maize and rice, large- and 
medium-scale farmers are important players in rice and 
(especially) sugar production. Large-scale production 
was explicitly targeted in the first results area. As already 
noted, irrigation investment, with a focus on rice, ended 
up being a major feature of the ASDP, but was also 
championed by Kilimo Kwanza. 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Big Results 
Now was a final attempt by President Kikwete to 
show commitment to agriculture ahead of the 2015 
elections – and perhaps achieve some impact where 
previous initiatives had delivered very little. Needless to 
say, the agricultural targets of Big Results Now were 
not met (DFID 2016). In June 2017, President Magufuli 
disbanded the Presidential Delivery Bureau that had 
been established to coordinate Big Results Now (The 
Citizen 2017).
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This section briefly summarises experiences from three 
agricultural commodity chains that shed further light 
on the political economy of agricultural policymaking in 
Tanzania. While some common themes emerge, there 
is also diversity across the commodity chains. These 
experiences must be seen as illustrative rather than 
providing a comprehensive picture for the agricultural 
sector as a whole. Moreover, the experiences 
summarised here all relate to the period of the Kikwete 
presidency from 2005–15. The final section of the paper 
considers how things might change under President 
Magufuli.
6.1 Sugar
Sulle (2016) analyses the expansion of sugar production 
on and around Kilombero Sugar Company in Morogoro 
region and, in particular, the political forces that have 
shaped this. His analysis highlights two main dynamics: 
the rise of medium-scale farms within the population 
of sugar outgrowers (a long-term threat to smallholder 
cane growers) and the struggle between domestic 
sugar production interests and importers (where the 
interests of medium-scale sugar outgrowers are aligned 
with those of smallholder cane growers).
KSCL was bought by Illovo in 1998, the first privatisation 
of a major state farm. According to Sulle (2016), the 
company was interested in expanding the core sugar 
estate, but was unable to acquire additional land. The 
1999 Village Land Act requires village councils to give 
their consent to expropriation of land for use by foreign 
investors, but the communities around Kilombero were 
unwilling to grant this. Instead, therefore, the company 
sought to expand its operations by increasing supplies 
from outgrowers. It received support for this from 
development agencies, including the European Union, 
which supported the capacity building of outgrower 
associations as well as financing road upgrading in the 
areas around the core estate. Consequently, although 
production on the core estate increased by 75 percent 
in the 15 years following privatisation, the share of total 
cane production supplied by outgrowers increased 
from 20 percent to 45 percent over this period.
According to company figures quoted by Sulle (2016), 
as of 2013/14, 70 percent of the cane supplied by 
outgrowers came from smallholders (defined as 
farms cultivating less than 5 hectares of land).26 The 
remainder came from farms cultivating 5–50 hectares 
(19 percent) and farms cultivating more than 50 
hectares (11 percent). While these medium-scale 
farms still accounted for a minority of outgrower 
supplies, this represented a considerable increase 
since privatisation. In 2002/03, KSCL purchased sugar 
from eight outgrowers cultivating 5–50 hectares and 
a further three cultivating more than 50 hectares. By 
2013/14, these figures were 1,667 and 13 respectively 
(Sulle 2016). Moreover, the same study cites company 
sources acknowledging that around 60 percent of the 
land within a 40km radius of the core estate is now 
cultivated to sugar. Given non-farm uses, this leaves 
limited room for smallholder food crop production and 
raises the prospect of some smallholders eventually 
selling or leasing their land near KSCL to medium-scale 
farms and seeking land elsewhere on which to continue 
their more diverse farming activities.
Sulle (2016) also reports that medium-scale farmers 
have secured control of the various associations of 
sugar outgrowers that both contract with KSCL on 
behalf of producers and lobby government in regard to 
sugar matters, and describes how they use this control 
to their advantage. Contracts between associations 
and KSCL are negotiated every three years. Over 
time, the associations have secured a rising share of 
the reference sugar price for outgrower suppliers and 
in exchange have assumed primary responsibility 
for providing services (seed supply, extension, 
transportation) to outgrowers. The rising share of the 
reference price benefits all growers, but medium-scale 
farmers have used their control of associations to benefit 
themselves. As owners of tractors and trucks, they 
supply these to their associations to provide services 
to other members. Associations also obtain quotas 
of sugar that they are contracted to supply to KSCL, 
presumably a consequence of the perishability of sugar 
once harvested, hence the need to carefully schedule 
supplies to the processing factory (Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig 1986). Medium-scale farmers can use their 
control of associations to ensure that they get secure 
production quotas, leaving some smallholder members 
with uncertainty over their ability to market the sugar 
that they produce (Sulle 2016).
INSIgHTS fROM SUgAR, RICE 
AND COTTON
6.
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Between 1998 and 2013/14, the number of associations 
contracting with KSCL rose from 2 to 15. Sulle (2016) 
indicates that this proliferation was the result of disputes 
within associations. This suggests that leaderships are 
not fully accountable to members. However, it would 
not be surprising if many of the disputes were between 
the more powerful members – that is, medium-scale 
farmers, with disgruntled individuals then choosing to 
establish their own associations. As associations have 
proliferated, some constitutions require leaders to 
farm a minimum area of land (10 or even 50 hectares). 
Sulle (2016) reports that Illovo was unhappy with the 
proliferation of associations, as this raises its transaction 
costs in negotiating and managing supply contracts. 
However, it also reduces the bargaining power of the 
associations in relation to Illovo. Is it possible that the 
share of the reference sugar price received by outgrower 
suppliers could have been even higher had it been 
negotiated by one or two consolidated associations?
The second dynamic highlighted by Sulle (2016) is the 
high-level political struggle between sugar producer 
and importer interests over sugar import licences. 
Although recent reforms have sought to create more 
of a genuine world market for sugar, the high levels of 
protection in most producing countries have historically 
made the world market a residual market where excess 
supplies are sold at artificially low prices (Tyler 2007b). 
Thus, tariff protection is self-reinforcing at the level 
of the international market system. In this context, 
a sensible sugar policy in a deficit country requires 
a predictable level of sugar imports at known tariff 
rates. However, in Tanzania, as in several other African 
countries, the temptation for senior politicians is to offer 
(additional) import licences and/or tariff waivers to rent-
seeking trading businesses, thereby destabilising price 
incentives for domestic producers. In Tanzania, the 
importers in question are understood to be primarily 
Tanzanians of Asian and Arab origin, who are also 
understood to be major funders of CCM (Booth et al. 
2014; Sulle 2016). The temptation to offer additional 
import licences or tariff waivers may be particularly 
strong in the run-up to an election, so as to both reduce 
sugar prices for consumers and to generate rents that 
then find their way into election coffers.
Unpredictable imports were a problem for domestic 
producers in Tanzania in both 2011/12 and 2013/14 
(Sulle 2016). In 2012/13, Tanzanian producers were 
forced to export sugar due to oversupply on the 
domestic market.27
The struggle between sugar producer and importer 
interests is one where the interests of large, medium-
scale and smallholder sugar producers are aligned. 
Sulle (2016) notes that outgrower representatives – 
who are predominantly medium-scale farmers – have 
worked with KSCL to lobby politicians on this matter. As 
former and current civil servants are reported to feature 
prominently among sugar outgrowers, their connections 
may contribute significantly to the effectiveness of such 
efforts. This should also benefit smallholders.
In 2016, incoming President John Magufuli took the 
side of domestic producers and personally committed 
to oversee import licensing for sugar. However, this 
action coincided with scarcity of sugar on the world 
market due to El Niño. It may also have provoked a 
response from importers, looking to signal the dangers 
for government of challenging their interests. Either way, 
the consequence was shortages of sugar in Tanzanian 
supermarkets and considerable price rises. Reorienting 
agricultural policy implementation so as to provide 
credible investment guarantees for domestic producers 
is not going to be an easy task.
6.2  Rice
Therkildsen (2011) analyses the failure of government 
efforts to promote irrigated rice production in Tanzania 
during the first term of President Kikwete. This failure 
is noteworthy for two reasons: (1) President Kikwete 
personally intervened in the preparations of the ASDP – 
the main implementation vehicle for the ASDS – to raise 
the priority of, and ambition for, irrigated rice production, 
seeking to gain political capital from this; and (2) 
coincidentally, a common East African Community 
(EAC) external tariff of 75 percent on imported rice 
came into effect in 2005, ostensibly providing strong 
incentives for domestic producers to invest in rice. 
In practice, despite a target to reach 1 million hectares 
of irrigated land within five years, the rate of growth in 
the total land area under irrigation in Tanzania continued 
at its pre-2005 levels, increasing from 264,000 hectares 
in 2006 to 332,000 hectares in 2010 (Therkildsen 2011). 
Figures quoted in Wilson and Lewis (2015: 53) suggest 
that much of this area is cultivated to rice, but also 
that the majority is ‘traditional’ or ‘improved traditional’ 
irrigation. Progress in installing modern irrigation 
systems for smallholders has ‘been slow mainly as a 
result of poor institutional development and inadequate 
funding’ (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, Tanzanian rice production has increased 
strongly, driven by rapidly growing urban demand, but 
over 70 percent of the area planted to rice remains 
rainfed. Wilson and Lewis (2015) suggest that the 75 
percent tariff has provided an important stimulus to 
domestic production, but Figure 1 suggests that the 
25Working Paper 05 | October 2017
spi21q2007Ake in international rice prices in 2007–
08 may have been equally as important. Either way, 
growing imports are projected in coming years.
Therkildsen’s (2011) argument is twofold. Firstly, weak 
implementation capacity at district level, coupled with 
the inability of central agencies to influence performance 
at district level, undermined efforts to rapidly scale up 
irrigation infrastructure for smallholders. Secondly, 
Figure 1: Tanzanian rice production 1995–2014
Source: FAOstat
unofficial imports of rice, principally through the port in 
Zanzibar, weakened the incentives provided by the 75 
percent common external tariff.
On the first point, once ambitious targets had been 
set for expanded irrigation infrastructure and some 
(albeit insufficient) donor money had been mobilised 
to support the efforts, there was an unhealthy focus 
on quantity of infrastructure at the expense of quality 
of irrigation services. District administrations, tasked 
with achieving the increases in irrigated area, sought 
first to rehabilitate existing systems that had fallen into 
disrepair, without addressing the factors – principally, 
neglect of systems for operations and maintenance – 
that had led to them falling into disrepair in the first place. 
The same omissions characterised proposals for new 
schemes. Often, proposals were advanced without a 
feasibility study to show that the scheme could catalyse 
productivity and profit increases to justify its investment 
cost or to support subventions for operations and 
maintenance. Periodic ASDP evaluation reports 
highlighted the absence of water user associations on 
new or rehabilitated schemes and the failure to collect 
anticipated user payments. However, central agencies 
were apparently unwilling or unable to coax a move 
towards better practice over the time period analysed 
by Therkildsen.
A focus on quantity of infrastructure could also facilitate 
rent seeking and distribution at district level. The 
primary vehicle here would be the granting of contracts 
for infrastructure rehabilitation or construction to 
individuals or firms with connections to district officials 
in the government or party machinery (Therkildsen 
2011). One piece of evidence that may support 
this interpretation is the number of schemes where 
rehabilitation or construction was started as part of 
ASDS, but not completed.
Overall, Therkildsen’s argument in relation to 
programme implementation is that the holding power 
that local CCM elites have acquired as a result of 
democratisation – through their importance to the party 
hierarchy in mobilising voters – has reduced the ability 
of central government agencies to discipline district 
administrations to deliver even on priority national 
development programmes.
On the second point, Therkildsen (2011) notes that 
official rice imports fell considerably following the 
introduction of the 75 percent tariff. However, rice 
prices in the country did not rise to reflect an associated 
shortage.28 The explanation here seems to be that rice 
was smuggled into the country via the port on Zanzibar. 
It is alleged that the rents associated with this trade are 
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important both to prominent individuals and to CCM 
party funding on Zanzibar. At the same time, rice is the 
staple food on Zanzibar, but production on the islands 
only satisfies around 10 percent of local demand, so 
keeping the import price low is an important political 
priority. Given the finely balanced political situation on 
Zanzibar, Therkildsen argues that mainland politicians 
were unwilling or unable to force their Zanzibari 
counterparts to clamp down on unofficial rice imports 
entering Dar es Salaam.
More recently, Wilson and Lewis (2015: 52) comment 
that:
The [common external tariff] applies… only to the 
mainland of Tanzania (imports to Zanzibar are 
subject to a smaller tariff of 25 percent, or are 
even exempt from tariff altogether). The law of 
unintended consequences again comes into force, 
and there is evidence that while official imports 
have declined, unofficial imports through Zanzibar 
have not (indeed importers through Zanzibar are 
likely to be making significant profits, as are those 
who are simply avoiding paying the tariff through a 
spectrum of devious ways).
They discuss the fact that the Government of Tanzania 
has periodically imposed export bans on Tanzanian 
rice – with the effect of reducing rice prices – at the 
same time as maintaining the (imperfectly enforced) 
import tariff, which should serve to raise prices. They 
observe that ‘the Government’s changing policies on 
export bans and import tariffs have reduced customer 
and investor confidence’ (Ibid.: 9) and list these as one 
of the ‘main threats’ to the future development of the 
industry.
Ultimately, both of Therkildsen’s points emphasise 
the inability or unwillingness of top CCM leadership 
to impose discipline on groups within the party who 
have acquired holding power through their contribution 
to winning elections, either as grassroots mobilisers 
of votes or as campaign funders. As with the sugar 
example, the power of importer interests is observed, 
presenting a challenge to policies that seek to 
encourage the capacity of domestic producers inter 
alia through tariff support. While the political importance 
of urban consumers is widely recognised in literature, 
the analysis reviewed in this paper emphasises the 
influence of the importers themselves through their 
contribution to CCM party funding.
6.3  Cotton
Recent experience within the cotton industry in Tanzania 
also presents a story of failure to implement a policy 
that had the public backing of President Kikwete: the 
introduction of contract farming.
The cotton industry in Tanzania is distinctive within 
Africa for its highly competitive market for seed 
cotton.29 Poulton and Maro (2009) reported that, from 
2003 to 2006, between 26 and 36 ginners purchased 
seed cotton at harvest time. The share of total seed 
cotton purchases accounted for by the top five buyers 
ranged from 35 percent to 45 percent, but the identities 
of the top five buyers changed each year. A decade 
later, only a modest amount of consolidation had taken 
place. From 2012 to 2014, between 30 and 34 ginners 
purchased seed cotton at harvest time. The share of 
total seed cotton purchases accounted for by the top 
five buyers had risen somewhat, to between 44 percent 
and 54 percent. Two companies appeared in the list of 
the top five buyers across all three years and another 
two companies featured in two of these years.
As explained by Poulton and Maro (2009) and Tschirley, 
Poulton and Labaste (2009), this high level of competition 
is a mixed blessing. Positively, it means that a high 
share of the available lint price is passed onto farmers 
through seed cotton pricing. Negatively, it makes it 
difficult to organise collective attempts to raise farmer 
productivity (through provision of extension support 
or input credit), and incentives for seed cotton quality 
have been abandoned in the scramble to acquire seed 
cotton. Thus, farmgate prices are constrained by the 
quality discounts applied to eventual lint sales and low 
yields more than outweigh the benefits of competition in 
driving returns to farmers’ labour input.
In 2008 the Tanzania Cotton Board (TCB) and the Cotton 
Sector Development Programme (CSDP), funded by 
the Gatsby Charitable Foundation, decided that the 
best way to improve farmer returns in cotton production 
was to introduce contract farming into the sector. A 
pilot programme run in Mara region during 2008–09 
to 2010–11 showed promising results in terms of both 
seed cotton yields and quality, with mixed performance 
in terms of loan recovery across the three participating 
ginners. The initiative was popular with farmers, in 
part because responsibility for seed cotton purchase 
was given to farmer business groups, mobilised and 
trained by TechnoServe, instead of the local buying 
agents who were traditionally relied on by ginning 
companies (Kiishweko 2010). These agents, who are 
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typically paid on commission (hence with an interest 
in volume rather than quality), are widely distrusted by 
farmers for fiddling weighing scales. Farmer anger at 
these practices prompts retaliatory measures, such as 
adulterating seed cotton deliveries with sand, water and 
other impurities that are an important part of the quality 
problems in the industry.
Encouraged by the experience of the pilot programme, 
during 2010 the TCB sought a change in the prevailing 
cotton legislation, so as to be given powers to regulate 
for the introduction of contract farming in other parts of 
the Tanzanian cotton-growing area. Ministerial support 
was not immediately forthcoming and the revised 
Cotton Act was passed following a change of minister 
after the 2010 election.
The TCB then announced that contract farming would 
be rolled out across the entire Tanzanian cotton-growing 
area during the 2011/12 production season. Apparently 
this rapid scaling up was in response to demand from 
regional and district commissioners, who had learned 
of the popularity of the Mara pilot. However, it was 
extraordinarily ambitious – not least because farmer 
business groups had yet to be established outside 
Mara. The primary mechanism for engaging ginners 
in the roll-out was to be a condition attached to the 
granting of buying licences – that ginners would only 
be allowed to buy in areas where they had supported 
farmer productivity through extension advice and 
provision of inputs on credit.
Some opposition to contract farming was expected from 
smaller ginners, who had less access to capital to fund 
provision of inputs on credit. In addition, many of the 
smaller ginners were perceived – by both the TCB and 
larger ginners – as having little interest in the long-term 
development of the industry. However, their continued 
presence in the industry, and ability to free-ride on 
initiatives led and funded by other ginners, was enough 
to discourage such initiatives, which were ultimately to 
the benefit of farmers. Contract farming was thus seen 
by some as a way of forcing smaller ginners either to 
contribute to longer-term industry development or to 
exit the industry altogether.
From 2012 to 2014, the top 15 ginners accounted for 
88–89 percent of total seed cotton purchases. Thus, 
while smaller ginners might be relatively numerous, the 
financial resources at their disposal for a campaign 
against contract farming appeared to be limited. 
However, their holding power turned out to be a 
function primarily of their connections within CCM, 
rather than financial resources. Their cause was also 
aided by the unrealistically rapid scaling out of contract 
farming that was announced, such that even ginners 
who ultimately stood to gain from contract farming were 
not persuaded that mechanisms existed to protect their 
investment in farmer support in 2011/12.
In practice, deadlines set by the TCB for ginners to 
deposit money to cover the costs of farmer support 
(primarily the importation of crop protection chemicals) 
passed without compliance. Farmer groups were 
hastily identified by district task forces and inputs were 
distributed, but paid for out of the Cotton Development 
Trust Fund (CDTF), an existing industry-wide fund. In 
March 2012, the Minister of Agriculture gave ginners 
an ultimatum to deposit their contributions by the end 
of May or be denied buying licences for the season 
commencing in June. He was reshuffled before the 
deadline expired and was replaced by his deputy. A 
bumper harvest followed, but loans were not recovered 
from farmers and the CDTF suffered a crippling loss. 
Later in the year the new minister pronounced contract 
farming to be ‘dead’.
In 2013, individual ginners resumed efforts to promote 
contract farming on a local level, recognising that 
cotton farming would become increasingly unattractive 
to Tanzanian smallholders unless efforts were made 
to raise the productivity of their cotton cultivation. 
However, the story of these subsequent efforts, which 
have remained contested, is not told here.
Figure 2 shows the positions of various industry 
stakeholders in regard to contract farming around 
June 2012. There are two striking features. Firstly, 
the Minister of Agriculture opposed contract farming, 
despite the fact that the President always remained 
publicly supportive of it (although he had to conduct 
the ministerial reshuffle in May 2012), and that it was 
promoted by the TCB, an agency that reported to the 
Minister. Secondly, regional and district commissioners 
from the main cotton-growing area in the north west 
of the country were generally supportive of contract 
farming, but many MPs from the same area were 
opposed to it. These two groups had access to the 
same local information about the Mara pilot and could 
both gauge farmer sentiment towards contract farming. 
The two features of the story are linked.
The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows a number of 
individuals and groups who stood to lose from contract 
farming and could make their opposition known either 
to MPs or, through MPs, to the Minister of Agriculture. It 
turns out that at least five MPs from the cotton-growing 
zone had some ownership stake in a cotton ginning 
company, generally the smaller companies that stood to 
lose from contract farming. Other ginners hold positions 
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within the CCM party apparatus at district or regional 
level. Additional opposition came from buying agents, 
who were directly threatened by the introduction of 
farmer business groups (FBGs). A significant number 
of these turned out also to be local councillors, who 
were, therefore, not only CCM members but also 
acted as election agents for MPs. The Tanzania Cotton 
Growers’ Association (TACOGA) presented itself as a 
representative voice of farmers and, in the early stages 
of the Mara pilot, was supportive of contract farming. 
However, its Chairman, Elias Zinzi, also operated as 
a cotton-buying agent in Bariadi, the largest cotton-
producing district in the country (Matthew 2013), and 
decided to campaign against contract farming during 
2011/12. 
Three men held the position of Minister of Agriculture 
during the period 2006–2015. Among these the 
dominant figure was Hon Stephen Wasira, MP for 
Bunda, part of the Mara region pilot for contract farming. 
Hon Wasira was a trusted ally of President Kikwete, 
having been brought back from a period in the political 
wilderness when Kikwete made his bid for President in 





















Farmers - generally enthusiastic ( if asked)
Figure 2: Industry stakeholders’ positions with respect to contract farming
Source: Author’s own
to 2010, then moved to the Office of the President, but 
was reintroduced as Minister in 2015 in the run-up to 
the election. The Minister who pronounced contract 
farming ‘dead’ was a former deputy of Hon Wasira.
It appears that Hon Wasira was sympathetic to the 
arguments advanced by fellow MPs and others within 
CCM from the cotton-growing area regarding contract 
farming. Their opposition can be understood both in 
terms of self-interest and in terms of what Whitfield et 
al. (2015) describe as African economic nationalism. 
In Tanzania, much economic activity has historically 
been controlled by Europeans and Asians. In the 
1950s and 1960s, African economic nationalism was 
first expressed through the efforts of cooperatives to 
challenge this power. It was closely bound up with 
the desire for political independence. Under President 
Nyerere, state organisations took responsibility for 
much of the economic activity previously controlled by 
Europeans and Asians. In an era of liberalisation, African 
economic nationalism may be expressed through the 
promotion of Tanzanian African enterprises in markets 
where foreign and/or Tanzanian Asian enterprises are 
once again important players. In all manifestations, the 
cause of the majority of Tanzanian citizens has been 
invoked, but wealthier and/or better-educated citizens 
have been driving forces and major beneficiaries.
In the 1950s and 1960s the cotton zone was home 
to the most vigorous cooperative movement in the 
country, which successfully challenged the dominance 
of Asian traders over seed cotton marketing and which 
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first campaigned against manipulation of seed cotton 
weighing scales. This history remains important today. 
Although the picture is more complicated than this, post-
liberalisation, many of the larger ginners in Tanzania are 
again Asian owned, so the campaign against contract 
farming could be presented as a campaign to protect 
farmers against forces that would ultimately seek to 
exploit them. A particular concern was the potential 
effect of contract farming on the seed cotton price – 
an issue that would indeed require regulatory attention, 
but which should be seen in the context both of the 
highly competitive seed cotton market and the fact that 
productivity gains through contract farming could more 
than offset losses to producers through attenuated 
price competition. However, there were also references 
in some pronouncements against contract farming 
about the influence of ‘wageni’ (foreigners). 
Hon Wasira himself first served as a minister under 
President Nyerere, but, starting in the 1990s, developed 
a range of business interests, including seafood exports. 
In relation to contract farming, he raised concerns about 
seed cotton pricing and also claimed a responsibility, 
as Minister for Agriculture and Cooperatives, to ensure 
that reforms to the seed cotton market left room for 
cooperatives.30 
In the context of this paper, however, the most important 
points are not the motives of particular actors, but their 
holding power. Many smaller ginners turned out to be 
well connected within local CCM party structures. In 
constituencies where cotton is a major economic activity 
and potential source of accumulation, links to cotton 
also provide one of the main ways of funding election 
for political office, whether as ward councillor or MP. In 
turn, it is argued that Hon Wasira was able to sustain 
an influential position on contract farming that was out 
of line with the consistently stated position of President 
Kikwete because the President valued Wasira‘s loyalty 
in internal party struggles that erupted when Kikwete 
dispensed with the services of his first Prime Minister 
(and, up to that point, his closest ally) Edward Lowassa, 
over a major corruption scandal.
One may still ask why many MPs in the cotton-growing 
zone adopted a position on contract farming that 
was out of line with the interests of a large number 
of their constituents. One possible explanation is 
that, in a context where rural voters have historically 
voted overwhelmingly for CCM, securing the CCM 
nomination was seen as the most important step in 
becoming an MP. For reasons that have already been 
explained, many people within the party structures had 
vested interests in the existing organisation of cotton 
marketing – not in reform. That some of these MPs 
were perceived not to be adequately representing the 
interests of their constituents became apparent at the 
2015 election, however. Hon Wasira was defeated in 
his Bunda constituency and at least one fellow MP with 
a prominent position within the cotton industry was 
deselected at the CCM primary stage.
Like the sugar and rice stories, the cotton story illustrates 
the influence of trading interests within CCM and the 
challenge that this poses for initiatives to promote 
domestic productive capacity in agriculture. Unlike the 
sugar and rice stories, however, the trading interests in 
the cotton story are not importers, but domestic trading 
companies that are interested primarily in buying and 
selling agricultural commodities. Some of these are 
small and need to turn over their scarce capital quickly. 
Others are larger, but engage in a range of markets – 
agricultural and non-agricultural – partly as a way of 
diversifying risk and partly as a way of deploying their 
capital wherever returns are currently highest. For both 
types, a cotton market that allows buyers to purchase 
seed cotton in June and July, gin it and sell the resulting 
lint by September, with minimal commitments for the 
remainder of the year, is ideal. Firms that are interested 
in developing the supply base of smallholder cotton 
farmers either wish to establish a position as specialist 
cotton ginners or have invested in related industries 
(oil crushing or textiles and garments) that require 
reliable raw material supplies. They tend to have more 
capital, but they also have a fundamentally longer-term 
perspective on the industry.
Why are trading interests so influential within CCM? 
One possible explanation is that, during the Nyerere 
years, there were few opportunities to develop private 
sector manufacturing and agro-processing firms in 
Tanzania. Economic distortions did, however, present 
opportunities to import scarce commodities, albeit 
unofficially. People who did this were sometimes 
labelled as ‘economic saboteurs’. However, when CCM 
reinvented itself under presidents Mwinyi and Mkapa 
– welcoming business people into its ranks so as to
fund election campaigns – these were precisely the
people who had accumulated the sort of capital that
the party was seeking. They have supported the pursuit
of economic liberalisation – a path that still sits uneasily
with some who have roots in the party’s socialist past.
However, intentionally or unintentionally, their pursuit
of their own interests through their connections within
the party may also have discouraged the development
of domestic productive capacity in agriculture and
elsewhere.
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This section draws primarily on the experiences of the 
three commodity chains that were summarised in the 
previous section to offer reflections on agricultural policy 
processes in Tanzania. It should be reiterated that these 
experiences are only illustrative, and do not provide a 
comprehensive picture for the agricultural sector as a 
whole.
7.1  Where are the key decisions   
 taken and who is involved? 
The three commodity chains present a diversity of 
experience with regard to the relative importance of 
central government and sub-national (region and district) 
administrations in decision-making and influence over 
policy outcomes. The differences reflect the nature 
of the commodity chains and specifically the ability 
of the major private actors to achieve coordination in 
service provision to smallholder suppliers without state 
support (Poulton et al. 2010; Poulton and Lyne 2009). 
Where the state plays, or should play, an active role in 
the delivery or facilitation of services, then sub-national 
administrations assume a greater role in decision-
making and influence over policy outcomes.
In the sugar case, village councils are involved in the 
land allocation process, given the significant influx of 
medium-scale farmers whose requirements fall below 
the 250 hectare threshold that would necessitate 
involvement of district authorities. However, local 
government plays very little role in service provision 
to sugar farmers. The perishability of harvested sugar 
cane means that farmers have to sell to the nearby 
processing factory; multiple marketing channels are 
not available. In turn, this facilitates the enforcement of 
contract farming arrangements, so farmers can access 
inputs and services on credit. In the Kilombero case, 
the core sugar estate has devolved responsibility for 
service provision to farmers’ associations. However, 
the need to transport harvested cane to the factory 
almost immediately makes it fairly straightforward for 
associations to secure payment for their services.
Meanwhile, several key decisions affecting the profitability 
of sugar production are negotiated at national level: the 
tariff levied on imported sugar; the amount of sugar that 
is imported (and the unofficial decisions that determine 
how fully the tariff is applied); and the pricing formula for 
sugar cane, which is negotiated across companies and 
growers’ associations. 
In the rice and cotton cases, policy is formally set by 
central government, but formal rules and informal 
practice have often pulled in different directions. In 
rice, the major manifestation of this is the uncertainty 
surrounding import volumes and tariffs plus export 
taxes. 
In cotton, the lack of alignment between the President, 
Prime Minister and the TCB on the one hand and the 
Minister of Agriculture on the other was highlighted in 
Figure 2. This intersected with the divergent positions 
adopted by regional and district commissioners and 
by MPs in the cotton-growing area. The former are 
presidential appointees and as such are supposed to 
represent the President’s wishes in their administrative 
areas. However, they also act as the President’s eyes and 
ears, so provide feedback on initiatives that are popular 
or unpopular in their areas. In this latter capacity, a 
number of regional and district commissioners in Mara, 
Shinyanga and Mwanza are understood to have given 
their support to the cotton contract farming initiative, 
based on the pilot in Mara.
Commencing in 2013, individual commissioners 
entered into discussions with ginners interested in 
pursuing local contract farming experiments in their 
areas. Commissioners undertook to use their control 
over policing to enforce restrictions on seed cotton 
marketing so as to provide a form of guarantee for 
ginners who invested in input provision and perhaps 
also extension support to local cotton farmers. During 
the 2014/15 season, an agreement of this nature, 
involving several ginners, was concluded for the whole 
of Geita region plus a couple of neighbouring districts. 
With only a fortnight to go until the official start of the 
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the Minister of Agriculture would use his authority over 
buying licences to grant buying rights, via the Shinyanga 
cooperative union, to a buyer that had not invested 
in the contract farming scheme. However, both the 
President and Prime Minister formally reaffirmed their 
support for the initiative, so the marketing restrictions 
were upheld in practice. Since then, a number of district 
commissioners have endorsed local contract farming 
agreements in their areas. However, others have 
taken a contrary view, including one case where it is 
understood that a disgruntled ginner used his influence 
within the regional CCM apparatus to persuade a 
commissioner to oppose the extension of such an 
agreement. In the cotton case, therefore, regional and 
district commissioners have assumed an increasing role 
in determining policy in practice, given the contested 
nature of policy at the centre. 
Cotton is a crop in which contract farming arrangements 
are common in Africa and elsewhere (Oya 2012; 
Tschirley et al. 2009). However, this relies on there 
being limits to, or restrictions on, the competition 
between ginners for the purchase of seed cotton, so 
as to facilitate the enforcement of contracts. In the 
competitive Tanzanian industry, ginners alone struggle 
to enforce loan repayment, which has created a role for 
regional and district administrations.
 
In the case of rice, state agencies have been directly 
involved in the development of irrigation infrastructure 
for smallholder producers. Theoretically, this role could 
have been performed by a national irrigation authority. 
However, Tanzania’s decentralisation policy means 
that responsibility has fallen to district administrations. 
Therkildsen’s (2011) observation is that they have 
exercised this responsibility with little effective control or 
discipline from the centre, but that this independence 
is more the result of the growing holding power of 
local political elites than the formal provisions of the 
decentralisation policy.
7.2  The role of donors,    
 farmers’ organisations    
 and business associations
The influence of donors over policymaking in Africa, 
for good or ill, has long been debated (Binswanger 
and Deininger 1997; Collier 2007; Edwards 2014; 
Mkandawire and Soludo 1999; Moyo 2010; Tilley 
2014; van de Walle 2001). In Tanzania, despite 
substantial increases in the domestic tax base over the 
past 20 years, donors continue to make an important 
contribution to the national budget (Therkildsen and 
Bourgouin 2012). They are also actively involved in the 
formal processes of policymaking, as was made clear 
in the review of strategies and initiatives in section 5. 
However, as illustrated by all three of the commodity 
case studies, policy implementation has often diverged 
from formal policy, reflecting the fragmentation of 
power within CCM. This reduces the influence that 
donors can exert over policy in practice, as shown 
by experiences in rice and cotton, and suggests a 
‘primacy of domestic politics’ in determining outcomes 
(de Renzio 2006).
In the rice case, the development of the ASDP was 
dominated by mid-level civil servants (technocrats) in 
collaboration with donor representatives (Therkildsen 
2011). Ministerial input was almost absent. The one 
striking exception to this picture was the unexpected 
intervention by president-in-waiting Kikwete to 
dramatically raise the ambition regarding the expansion 
of irrigated area to be achieved during the programme. 
This, however, was never fully matched by funding 
pledges.
As explained by Therkildsen (2011), significant 
challenges were encountered during the implementation 
of the programme, notably around systems for operation 
and maintenance of new and rehabilitated irrigation 
schemes. Joint government and donor monitoring 
reports highlighted these, but did not apparently lead to 
a change in practice. Moreover, overall progress in the 
programme was classified as ‘satisfactory’. Cooksey 
(2012) criticises donors for acquiescing to unduly rosy 
assessments of programmes that they fund, recognising 
that they are under increasing pressure to show value 
for money from their activities to domestic taxpayers.
In the cotton case, early funding for the CSDP was 
provided by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation, later 
joined by DFID. Staff funded through the CSDP, national 
and expatriate, have worked with the TCB to develop 
and support contract farming initiatives. Although they 
have actively sought to monitor political forces that can 
affect programme implementation, staff of the CSDP 
and TCB have been powerless to push through contract 
farming reforms when opposition has been entrenched. 
This should not be surprising, given that the President’s 
own stated support for the programme has not been 
enough to see it implemented.
With some notable exceptions, including cotton 
farmers in Burkina Faso and Mali, farmers’ associations 
in Africa are commonly seen as weak. The sugar and 
cotton cases in Tanzania provide contrasting examples, 
emphasising the importance of going beyond 
generalisations. As noted in section 6.1, sugar has 
attracted the interest of plenty of well-connected urban-
based farmers, who have subsequently assumed 
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prominent positions within growers’ associations. This 
gives these associations a greater degree of bargaining 
power with government and companies than is found 
in most other commodity chains in Tanzania, although 
this is partially offset by the splintering of associations 
that has occurred (Sulle 2016). One potential concern 
with the dominance of medium-scale farmers within 
sugar growers’ associations is that their interests might 
diverge from those of smallholders. This could be the 
case in regard to the services provided to cane growers 
by associations and how much growers have to pay for 
these services (Sulle 2016), but their interests are more 
closely aligned in relation to sugar cane pricing and the 
regulation of sugar imports.
In cotton, there is a long history of cooperative 
involvement, but primary societies and cooperative 
unions have long ceased to function as effective 
membership societies, and they have been unable to 
compete with private buyers in a liberalised market. 
TACOGA aspires to fill part of the gap left by the 
decline of the historic cooperatives and it is formally 
represented in the governance structures of the CDTF. 
However, TACOGA has never had the resources with 
which to build a strong, representative membership 
base (Kabissa 2014); indeed, its establishment may be 
seen as something of an opportunistic move on behalf 
of its first Chairman, Zinzi. Farmer business groups 
were promoted as a central element of the contract 
farming model that was piloted in Mara. They were 
clearly perceived as a threat by existing buying agents, 
which may be taken as an indication of their potential 
to bring benefits to farmers. However, reliance on an 
external agency for their mobilisation was resource 
intensive and subsequent experiments with contract 
farming have worked with individual farmers, albeit 
exploring alternative ways of doing this. As in sugar, 
strong farmers’ associations may only arise when there 
is symbiosis with the buying companies. To date, the 
institutional framework for contract farming has been 
too contested to allow companies to invest in medium- 
or long-term efforts to build up the smallholder supply 
base – a prerequisite for any such symbiosis.
Finally, business associations have not featured in the 
accounts of any of the three sectors, although the role 
of the TNBC and ACT in developing Kilimo Kwanza and 
subsequently in supporting SAGCOT was highlighted in 
section 5. In the cotton case, the account emphasised 
the heterogeneity of ginners (see Figure 2). Divisions 
between ginners that are fundamentally trading firms and 
those that want to pursue a longer-term developmental 
agenda for the industry have undermined collective 
efforts to raise farmer productivity since liberalisation, 
whether these efforts have been driven by the TCB 
or by sub-groups of ginners. The Tanzania Cotton 
Association (TCA), which formally represents ginners 
in some public forums, is severely weakened by these 
divisions.
Commenting on the Tanzanian economy as a whole, 
Therkildsen and Bourgouin (2012) report that in 2007, 
410 large companies paid almost half of the total 
taxes collected in the country. They observe that this 
should give these companies considerable influence 
over policymaking and implementation. However, they 
find that, ‘the relationships of such companies to the 
state are particularistic rather than formally organised’ 
(Ibid.: 38), which reduces their influence. In the three 
commodity case studies considered in this report, 
the relationships of companies to the state are indeed 
primarily particularistic, effected through connections 
within CCM. However, this still translates into discernible 
influence over policy implementation – for example, rice 
and sugar importation, and the non-implementation of 
contract farming. 
ACT represents a range of private sector interests, 
both large and small. Through first Kilimo Kwanza and 
subsequently SAGCOT, it has contributed significantly 
to policy discourse. It has no direct influence over 
public agricultural expenditure, so many elements 
of the Kilimo Kwanza programme have yet to be 
implemented (and may never be). Nevertheless, the 
constituency of entrepreneurially minded Tanzanians 
that ACT represents has grown in economic and 
political influence since the establishment of ACT and it 
seems likely that they will continue to do so in coming 
years. 
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This paper was written 18 months into the presidency of 
John Magufuli and there is still considerable uncertainty 
about what impact his presidency will have on 
agricultural policy and performance (as on many other 
areas). There was considerable enthusiasm initially for 
his energy, apparent willingness to tackle corruption 
and emphasis on delivery of public services. However, 
many people’s enthusiasm has been tempered by 
concerns over an authoritarian streak in his personality 
and government, as well as by economic dislocation 
resulting from some of his anti-corruption initiatives, 
which have hit the banking sector31 and reduced the 
volume of grey money circulating in the economy.
Looking at the record to date, some question whether 
President Magufuli has a clear vision or strategy. 
By contrast, this section posits a coherent vision 
to restructure power relations within Tanzania. This 
vision returns to the original objectives of TANU and 
the early cooperative movement (strong in Magufuli’s 
home region of the Lake Zone): to establish power in 
the hands of the African majority, asserting a greater 
degree of control over the Asian traders and external 
business interests that have dominated the Tanzanian 
economy for significant periods of the past century. Not 
only does state power have to be exerted to effect this 
change, but CCM itself needs to be reformed. During 
the liberalisation era, the party has wandered from its 
original objectives. In the process, powerful vested 
interests have established themselves within the party. 
To achieve his economic and social vision, President 
Magufuli has to confront the power of these groups and 
gradually replace them with people loyal to his ideals. 
The big question is whether he can achieve all this.
In his election campaign in 2015 Magufuli emphasised 
that he would be a president who delivered jobs and 
services to ordinary Tanzanians – in (undisguised) 
contrast to his predecessor, who promised much 
but was widely perceived to have delivered little. This 
likely reflects a recognition that CCM’s hold on power 
has become increasingly insecure over time, the 
comfortable margins of victory in elections to date 
(Table 1) notwithstanding. The low rural turnout in 2010 
was a cause for concern. Nationally, the opposition 
challenge in 2015 was the strongest yet.
The nature of the 2015 presidential contest also 
necessitated an emphasis on delivery. Magufuli’s 
opponent, Edward Lowassa, had been forced to stand 
down as Prime Minister as a result of a corruption 
scandal, even if he claimed to have been treated as 
a scapegoat in this matter. Nevertheless, he retained 
a reputation for getting things done, which gave him 
popularity. With Lowassa’s defection to the opposition 
– a possibility at the time that CCM completed its 
selection process – CCM needed a candidate who 
could also credibly claim to get things done. Magufuli’s 
track record as Minister of Works enabled him to make 
this claim. His personality also inclines him to action.
Magufuli also apparently perceived that he had an 
opportunity to achieve change. In his bid for the CCM 
presidential nomination, Magufuli’s predecessor, Jakaya 
Kikwete, mobilised a network (‘mtandao’) of supporters 
who backed him with money and influence within the 
party committees that comprise the selection process.32 
Some of these people, like Lowassa and Wasira, were 
brought back to the centre of CCM politics by Kikwete’s 
bid for power, so debts ran both ways. Nevertheless, it 
is understood that Kikwete came to power with debts, 
both financial and personal, to numerous individuals, 
who could thus call in favours during his presidency. 
Where these favours related to companies, they could 
impact on policy implementation (albeit informally), thus 
weakening the ability of Kikwete’s administration to 
pursue consistent policy objectives.
By contrast, Magufuli emerged as the surprise CCM 
presidential candidate when the two frontrunners, 
Lowassa and Bernard Membe, were vetoed within the 
various party committees – victims of the feud between 
Kikwete and Lowassa that dated back to the latter’s 
dismissal as Prime Minister. At this point, with Lowassa 
now threatening a well-funded opposition challenge, 
CCM needed Magufuli’s energy and reputation for 
delivery as much as he needed the party. In contrast 
to Kikwete, it would appear that he emerged from the 
selection process beholden to relatively few people.
There is greater uncertainty over the financing of 
Magufuli’s campaign. It was not flashy; it deliberately 
set out to portray him as a friend of the worker and 
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the farmer – in stark contrast to the enormously rich 
Lowassa. It was thus not particularly expensive. In a 
televised meeting with members of the TNBC in Dar es 
Salaam on 3 December 2015, soon after the election, 
Magufuli challenged them to say whether he had 
sought money from any of them to finance his election 
campaign (The Insider 2015). He claimed that he was 
not indebted to any of them, a claim that gained some 
credence when he took high-profile action against 
under-payment of customs duty at Dar es Salaam 
port, apparently taking on some of the large import 
firms that were believed to have financed previous 
CCM campaigns. However, TNBC members are not 
necessarily representative of all businesses in Tanzania 
in regard to this matter. Few believe that his campaign 
was funded wholly or even primarily out of the official 
election subvention for CCM, large though that is in 
relation to the official funding for opposition parties. 
Nevertheless, it seems that Magufuli is freer from past 
debts to large businesses than Kikwete was.
Yet Magufuli still has to consolidate his own support base 
within the party, which was not thought to be particularly 
strong at the time of his nomination, and to secure 
party funding for the 2020 election. Policy change is 
not simply a question of redrafting formal documents to 
conform to the ideology and priority of the new person 
in charge, but of building and consolidating a coalition 
to support the new direction of travel. Ultimately he has 
to craft a credible plan for winning the next election, 
despite pursuing a course that will upset many actors 
whom he would otherwise have relied on for party 
funding or for grassroots voter mobilisation. Of course, 
a track record of policy delivery should itself provide a 
strong foundation for an election campaign. The risk is 
that there are lag times in delivering policy outcomes, 
whereas vested interests are upset more immediately, 
such that the president fights for re-election without 
CCM’s traditional organisational resources but before 
voters have seen many of the changes to delivery that 
were promised.
President Magufuli has, therefore, engaged 
energetically both in radical policy initiatives and in 
attempts to reform CCM. His intention to restructure 
power relations within the economy is observed in 
efforts to redefine the terms on which the state engages 
with both telecoms and mining companies. Both of 
these key sectors are dominated by multinational 
companies. His determination to move government 
ministries from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma – after years 
in which this was official policy but not implemented 
– may appear symbolic, but could also alter power 
relations in important ways. In this case, distance will 
be placed between importer interests (located in Dar 
es Salaam) and government ministries. At the same 
time, representatives of the Lake Zone and west of 
Tanzania will gain greater access to national political 
decision-making. It is noteworthy that Magufuli is the 
first president since Nyerere whose home area has 
been closer to Dodoma than to Dar.
President Magufuli’s mantra of promoting 
industrialisation has to be analysed in light of the factors 
just discussed. As well as generating employment, this 
emphasises the expansion of domestic production 
capacity at the expense of importation. References 
to industrialisation sometimes explicitly mention agri-
processing, but not always. However, those responsible 
for turning the objective of industrialisation into practical 
policy implementation know that agri-processing, and 
hence links to the agriculture sector, will be critical to 
success.
The top expenditure priority of the Magufuli government 
is infrastructure: roads, railways, ports, rural 
electrification. This, plus the current economic squeeze, 
means that funds for direct agricultural investment are 
extremely limited. Agriculture’s share of the national 
budget is unlikely to rise in the immediate future and 
expensive programmes, such as the fertiliser subsidy 
programme, have been dramatically scaled back. 
Instead, policy attention is being focused on individual 
agricultural value chains and what can be done, at low 
cost, to enhance their efficiency and/or productivity.
The commodity case studies in section 6 highlighted 
the systemic challenges that confront a CCM president 
who wants to deliver results in agriculture: the dispersed 
nature of power within CCM and hence the wide range 
of individuals and groups with holding power to claim 
rents from state activity and to resist reforms that seek 
to remove these. President Magufuli has, therefore, set 
about challenging the power of some of these individuals 
and groups, so as to enforce his preferred policies from 
the centre. Most notably, he has committed to providing 
tariff protection to domestic producers, taking on the 
power of importers. This may be politically costly, but 
has a neutral or positive impact on the national budget. 
His championing of domestic sugar processors and 
restricting import volumes was noted in section 6.1. He 
has similarly upheld the tariff on rice imports. Oilseeds 
are another area where domestic production stands to 
benefit against import competition.
The sugar example illustrates how difficult it is going 
to be to reorient the economy and the party towards 
domestic production. However, this reorientation does 
not have to depend entirely on bringing new players 
into the heart of the party. President Magufuli will be 
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hoping to persuade existing trading firms to invest more 
in domestic productive capacity (Masare 2016).
To strengthen the ability of central government to impose 
discipline on elites at local government level, under 
President Magufuli, regional and district commissioners 
report directly to the Office of the President rather than 
the Prime Minister, and have been given expanded 
powers. The President has also replaced most existing 
post-holders with his own appointees.33 In the short 
term this should enhance the capacity of government 
to deliver services to citizens. However, the lower 
tiers of the party hierarchy will themselves have to be 
excited by the outcomes if they are to campaign with 
enthusiasm come 2020.
The popular campaign against corruption has given 
President Magufuli the opportunity both to pursue 
politicians and business people who supported Edward 
Lowassa in the 2015 election and to restrict the 
resources flowing to elements within CCM who might 
oppose the government’s new policy directions. New 
restrictions on freedom of speech and the freedom of 
association for opposition parties were highlighted as a 
genuine cause for concern in section 3. A sympathetic 
interpretation is that restrictions on freedom of speech 
may be deployed to keep intra-CCM battles out of the 
public eye as Magufuli seeks to stamp his authority 
on the party and bring it into line with his vision for a 
reputation based on policy delivery. Meanwhile, the 
tough line taken against opposition parties can be 
understood (though not endorsed) in part as a way of 
closing off the exit options – and hence reducing the 
bargaining power – of people within CCM who stand 
to lose from the new policy stances. However, if the 
vested interests favouring the status quo prove too 
strong or the obstacles to improving public services 
and creating jobs create long lags before improved 
performance is seen, CCM will again depend primarily 
on its organisational advantages at the 2020 election 
and these restrictions on civil liberties will be a powerful 
weapon to ensure the continuing hegemony of CCM.
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1 SOAS, University of London. cp31@soas. 
ac.uk
2 The party that assumed power on Tanzania  
mainland (Tanganyika) at independence  
was the Tanzania African National   
Union (TANU). In 1977 this merged with the  
Afro-Shirazi Party, which governed Zanzibar, 
to form CCM.
3 (Khan 2011: 23) defines ‘holding power’  
as ‘… the ability of a particular  
organization [or group] to hold out in actual or 
potential conflicts against other organizations, 
including the enforcement organizations of 
the state. The organization that can survive 
longest in a conflict with organizations with 
contrary interests is likely to be able to achieve 
a change in formal or informal institutions in 
line with its interests.’
4 Both Mbeya and Morogoro regions fall within 
the SAGCOT zone, which is discussed in 
more detail below.
5 UKAWA stands for Umoja wa Katiba ya 
Wananchi and was originally formed in 
2014 to provide a strong voice on proposed 
changes to the Constitution. President 
Kikwete and his government suspended 
efforts to revise the Constitution in 2015.
6 The figures in Table 1 refer to Union elections 
comprising both Tanzania mainland and 
Zanzibar. Zanzibar also maintains its own 
Parliament, which has sovereignty over 
matters designated as non-Union matters, 
including agriculture, and elects its own 
President, who then also acts as one of two 
Vice-Presidents in the Union government. 
Unlike Union elections, all elections for the 
Zanzibar presidency and Parliament since 
1995 have been extremely close. They have 
also become increasingly prone to violence 
as opposition supporters protest at perceived 
rigging of the results. In 2010 CCM and Civic 
United Front (CUF), the two main parties on 
Zanzibar, formed a government of national 
unity to head off another round of (feared) 
violence. In 2015 the election result was 
declared void by the Zanzibar Electoral 
Commission after the CUF presidential 
candidate had declared himself the winner, 
and a re-run was ordered for early 2016. 
However, CUF boycotted the re-run.
7 According to Hoffman and Robinson (2009), 
the CCM Constitution still recognises them as 
the party’s representatives in their respective 
areas.
8 Opposition parties gained more seats than 
CCM in three northern regions for the first 
time in the 2015 elections (Kimboy 2015).
9 There is a high turnover of candidates in CCM 
primary elections (Twaweza 2010), which may 
partially reflect this.
10 Similar dynamics are seen in other parts 
of Africa, too. On average, rural voters are 
more likely to vote for incumbent presidents 
than their urban counterparts (Bratton et al. 
2011). The lower education levels and more 
limited access to communications of rural 
populations may contribute to this.
11 Rural water supply is an interesting case of 
neglect and broken promises that featured 
prominently in election campaign rallies in 
2015. 
12 The figures for enrolment in primary education 
1995-2005 in Table 2 bear testimony to this 
effort. The enrolment rate continued to rise to 
95 percent in 2008, but has since fallen back 
(World Development Indicators database, 
accessed 9 January 2017). However, many 
more primary pupils are now progressing to 
lower secondary education. 
13 Prior to structural adjustment, the government 
had provided fertiliser subsidies primarily to 
four maize surplus regions in the Southern 
Highlands (Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa and 
Ruvuma). These subsidies, plus the policy of 
pan-territorial maize pricing, compensated 
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the farmers in these regions for the effects of 
exchange rate overvaluation on maize pricing. 
They were phased out as part of the structural 
adjustment process.
14 During the Nyerere years, policy did at times 
promote large-scale state or collective farms. 
However, large-scale private agricultural 
enterprises have only gradually risen to 
prominence since structural adjustment.
15 These include commercial forestry plantations, 
but exclude livestock ranches.
16 According to FAOstat [accessed 20 January 
2017], in 2013 Tanzania imported wheat 
worth US$312 million, sugar (in various forms) 
worth US$145 million and rice worth US$128 
million.
17 This is based on a list of 17 large-scale 
projects recorded as being ‘in production’ 
(database downloaded 7 October 2016). Of 
these 17 projects, 11 signed their lease or 
other contract since 2008 and four prior to 
this. (The remaining two are undated.) The 
areas granted by the respective leases range 
from 263ha to 22,300ha, the latter being 
a biofuels (sorghum and sugar) project in 
Bagamoyo. However, actual production areas 
at the time of the various reports sourced 
by Land Matrix ranged from only 30ha to 
9,000ha. The largest project in the list is the 
teak project (28,000ha), but this refers to 
the area covered by an exploitation licence, 
rather than a lease. As of 7 October 2016, 
the Land Matrix database also included: four 
projects (various crops) recorded as being in 
a ‘start-up phase’ prior to production; seven 
(including some sugar cane and rice) that 
have simply ‘not started’, and 11 projects 
(originally intended to grow jatropha, oil palm 
or rice) that are recorded as ‘abandoned’.
18 Rist (2014: 132) cites claims in Nyerere (1977) 
that ‘by 1977 a total of 7684 villages housed 
more than 13 million people’. This would 
amount to 75 percent of the total population 
and approaching 90 percent of the rural 
population in 1977.
19 With Tanzania’s gradual shift towards 
decentralisation, these service delivery 
and support functions were as likely to be 
provided by local government administrations 
as by central government.
20 Cooksey (2003) advanced a similar argument, 
claiming that such powers encouraged 
interventionism.
21 More research would be required to clarify 
whether this was motivated primarily by 
ideology or by institutional interests to control 
the large flows of money that would be 
associated with ASDP.
22 TNBC comprises up to 40 members – 20 
from each of the public and private sectors – 
all of whom are appointed by the President. 
Private sector members are recommended 
for appointment by the Tanzania Private 
Sector Forum. TNBC was established by 
then-President Mkapa, under Presidential 
Circular No. 1 of 2001, as a forum for public 
and private sector dialogue to foster ‘a healthy 
and robust economy where the guiding hand 
of government, through enlightened legislation 
and transparent governance enhances the 
development of private initiatives, encourages 
local and foreign investments and provides an 
enabling environment for economic growth’ 
(http://tnbc.go.tz/v2, accessed 5 June 2017). 
As well as stimulating dialogue between 
appointed members, TNBC organises 
roundtable events with local and international 
investors.
23 Similar to TNBC, but with a specific focus on 
the agriculture sector, ACT was established in 
1999 as Tanzania Chamber of Agriculture and 
Livestock and ‘inaugurated’ the following year 
by then-President Mkapa. It changed its name 
to ACT in 2005. It describes itself as ‘the 
agricultural private sector apex organization 
in Tanzania’. It welcomes farmer groups and 
associations, cooperatives, companies and 
agricultural institutions into membership. 
Its mission is to pursue ‘modernize[d] and 
commercialized agriculture in Tanzania’. 
ACT’s Board of Directors includes people 
with public, private and non-government 
organisation (NGO) sector backgrounds. The 
current Executive Director, Janet Bitegeko, 
was formerly Director for Policy and Planning 
in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security 
and Cooperatives, where she ‘coordinated 
the formulation of the Agricultural Sector 
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Development Strategy (ASDS) in 2001 and 
the preparation of the Agricultural Sector 
Development Programme (ASDP) which was 
concluded in 2006’ (http://actanzania.or.tz/
about-us/who-we-are, accessed 5 June 
2017).
24 The notion that agricultural transformation 
is a precondition for wider structural 
transformation is questionable. Some 
productivity increase within the agriculture 
sector may be required to catalyse wider 
processes of structural transformation. 
However, the transformation of the agriculture 
sector proceeds in tandem with wider 
processes of structural transformation and, 
indeed, is increasingly driven by changes 
in the non-farm economy as those wider 
processes unfold (Poulton 2017).
25 According to FAOstat [accessed 5 June 
2017], the total area of land cultivated for crop 
production in Tanzania in 2014 was 15.65 
million hectares. The comparable figure in 
2005 was 11.36 million hectares. Thus, while 
350,000 hectares is a large area, it does not 
represent a particularly large increase in area 
cultivated within the SAGCOT zone over a 
15-year period. We should expect the area
cultivated by smallholders to increase by
much more than this by 2030. By contrast,
finding 350,000 hectares that are available for
use within large-scale farms would be a major
challenge.
26 It is unclear whether this refers to total area 
cultivated by the smallholder household or 
area of sugar cultivated.
27 Source: Sugar Board of Tanzania, www.sbt.
go.tz/index.php/datas [accessed 10 May 
2017]. 
28 Another explanation is that substitutability 
between imported rice, which is generally 
non-aromatic and low quality, and domestic 
rice, much of which is (semi-)aromatic and 
higher quality, is low (Lazaro et al. 2017). 
Instead, imported rice is a substitute primarily 
for maize among lower-income urban 
consumers. However, even Lazaro et al. 
(2017) acknowledge anecdotal evidence 
that a formal tariff waiver during 2012-13 did 
depress the domestic price of rice. 
29 Cotton farmers grow seed cotton and harvest 
seed cotton bolls. A boll comprises cotton 
fibres that grow as a protective casing around 
the seeds of the cotton plant. During the 
first stage of processing, known as ginning 
(conducted at ginneries by ginners), the 
cotton fibres are separated from the seeds. 
The separated fibres, known as cotton lint, 
are sold onto spinners to make thread, while 
the seeds are typically crushed to give edible 
oil, leaving seed cake which is a good source 
of feed for livestock.
30 In fact, cooperatives were largely competed 
out of the seed cotton market by private 
ginners in the first decade after liberalisation 
(Poulton and Maro 2009). In 2010/11, 
immediately prior to the proposed roll-out 
of contract farming, they accounted for just 
2 percent of total seed cotton purchases in 
Tanzania. 
31 In January 2016 the government directed 
state agencies (ministries, public corporations 
and local government authorities) to transfer 
accounts held in the country’s commercial 
banks to the Bank of Tanzania (The Citizen 
2016). Commercial banks have responded by 
reducing the volume of new lending until such 
time as they have rebuilt their balance sheets.
32 See Mtega 2015 for the 2015 selection 
process.
33 Presidents regularly reshuffle regional and 
district commissioners, but this was a rapid 
and thorough refresh.
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